relationship of the Heir Apparent to such Bohemian aristocrats as Count Ottokar Czernin, the future World War Minister of Foreign Affairs; Count Heinrich Clam-Martinic, future Prime Minister; Count Ernst Silva-Tarouca, Prince Karl Schwarzenberg, and above all to Prince Franz Thun, Governor of Bohemia of long standing, Austrian Prime Minister and one time Master of the archducal household. Relationships to other high officials are surveyed as well as far as they pertain to the Bohemian question. The most important documents among the many interesting ones published here for the first time are the letters written by the Archduke himself. They reflect in full the strange, in some ways repellent and in others fascinating personality of this autocrat.

As the interpretation of these documents reveals, the position of the Archduke in regard to the national conflict in Bohemia could be considered as neutral above the parties. While Francis Ferdinand was in general in favour of a German directed centralistic state structure and therewith an opponent of strong nationalistic tendencies, he feared the power of German perhaps more than of Czech nationalism. To him nationalism was within strict limits acceptable as long as it seemed to serve as means to the end of breaking the power of the dualistic political system which in his opinion was completely dominated by Magyar aspirations. Accordingly Czech, German, or any other national movement was welcome to him as long as it offered the chance to strengthen the position of the Crown above the peoples. He abhorred the same movements as soon as he felt that they impaired this status.

ON THE ACTIVITY OF THE SLOVÁK DEPUTIES IN THE FIRST CZECHOSLOVAK NATIONAL ASSEMBLY (1918—1920)

Ladislav Lipscher

After the declaration of independence of the Czechoslovak Republic, the National Council exercised the functions of supreme legislative and governmental organ. The 254-member-strong enlarged National Council constituted itself as a Revolutionary National Assembly on 14 November 1918. Slovakia was originally assigned 40 deputies, the number later being raised to 53. The Slovak parliamentary representatives, irrespective of party affiliation, joined together in a parliamentary group called the “Club of Slovak Deputies“. The official justification for this unusual move was that the resulting concentration of political forces would enable a more effective assertion of Slovak interests, all the more since a fully articulated system of political parties did not exist in Slovakia.

Throughout its existence the Club was a firm link in the different coalitions, which meant that it could take active part in the work of the govern-
ment. The circumstance that the Club played the most important role in the political life of Slovakia at the time distinguished the framework of its activity from that of other similar institutions. In addition to its principal field of work — taking the legislative initiative and voting on draft laws — the Club also assumed a major role in the solution of questions which were not directly related to its normal sphere of activity. Thus its meetings discussed the crucial problems of the structure and organization of the administrative apparatus in Slovakia.

This joint public posture on the part of the Slovak deputies by no means signified any uniformity of political conviction, but only that they upheld the common position adopted in the Club. The development of party pluralism in Slovakia, heightened by the penetration of political currents from the Bohemian lands, advanced rapidly. With the dissolution of the First National Assembly, the Club formally ceased its own activity as well.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE PROBLEMS OF THE RUHR OCCUPATION, 1923

Manfred Alexander

Examines the attitude of the Czechoslovak government to the questions of German reparations under the Versailles Peace Treaty and of the sanctions threatened or applied to enforce these reparations. The author's starting point is the thesis that France, and in particular the Poincaré government, presented French security as closely linked with the reparations question and considered reparations demands and the threat of sanctions as a means of asserting the French security policy vis-à-vis Germany. From this viewpoint he examines the position of Czechoslovakia within the French system of alliances in eastern Central Europe, with emphasis on how the German Foreign Office viewed the problem and incorporated its assessment in considerations of political options.

The conclusion is that the Czechoslovak government did not succumb to any of the French attempts to press it into some form of participation in the Ruhr occupation in 1923. This stand, however, was only reluctantly acknowledged by the German side, especially by the German regions bordering on Czechoslovakia. The author surveys German-Czechoslovak relations from 1921 to the spring of 1923 in their international context. Their most striking feature was that, despite the Czechoslovak endeavors to preserve neutrality toward Germany, the feeling persisted on the German side that Prague, as an ally of France, represented a latent threat. In short, German mistrust of Czechoslovakia was lessened by the latter's neutral stand, but not eliminated.