of Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Beneš in the first five years of an independent Czechoslovak foreign policy. Against the background of the estrangement between France and England over Poincaré's policy toward Germany, Beneš — after long hesitation — had to accept a treaty that promised him French support, but at the price of mistrust in Great Britain, Germany, and among the Little Entente allies. With this step, Beneš hoped to play the role of mediator in a whole series of questions — French-English relations after the Ruhr conflict and the victory of the Labour party; recognition of the Soviet regime by Great Britain; and settlement of reparations questions for Germany. All this, however, meant overextending the possibilities of Czechoslovak foreign policy, and all of these efforts ended in failure. Thereafter, there was a transition from this „diplomacy of mediation“ phase to one in which the League of Nations policy was given stronger emphasis.

AT THE LIMITS OF A MASS MOVEMENT: THE CASE OF THE SUDETEN GERMAN PARTY 1933—1938

Ronald M. Smelser

Examines the internal development of the Henlein movement into a political mass movement in a small country, and the influence exerted on it by the Reichsdeutsch NSDAP. The analysis reveals that the strong growth of membership in the spring of 1935 resulted primarily from disappointment over the failures of Sudeten German activism in the solution of economic and national problems. Only in the second strong surge of membership, beginning in the spring of 1938, did international developments, especially the Austrian Anschluss, also come to play a role alongside domestic factors. It is shown that the Sudeten German party could be misused by Hitler for his own goals mainly because this Sudeten German mass movement lacked any dynamic coordinator who could have given this pluralistic movement a weight of its own.

T. G. MASARYK'S PRÄSIDENTSCHAFTSDEMOKRATIE

Emil Schieche

T. G. Masaryk was elected president by the National Assembly, consisting of Chamber of Deputies and Senate, and not by the people; there was, in other words, no Präsidialdemokratie in Czechoslovakia. The initiative of the head of state which was often decisive in domestic questions, and the practical cooperation between President and Prime Minister were nothing more than mere elements of a Präsidialdemokratie. Masaryk exercised his presidential office as a charismatic leader always guided by democratic principles. To preserve the rights and duties granted him under the Constitution (some of which indeed bore the mark of a Präsidialdemokratie) he needed a small circle of trusted associates, which com-