system of government was an inadequate basis for conducting the policy of Ausgleich. What is more, except for the Austrian Social Democracy, there was no supranational political party. The predominance of the Germans in the state could only be maintained for a certain period of time by means of the system of election by socioeconomic classes (Zensuswahlsrecht). The language question as well as the controversies over the recognition of national demands were an expression of irreconcilable bourgeois ideologies.

The erroneous policy of the bourgeois nationalists was also manifest in their sociopolitical efforts, which were frequently directed toward securing the national property. Only personalities with the stature of a Joseph Maria Baernreither or a Joseph Redlich were able to gain deeper insight into the importance of social policy as a factor of integration. They were, however, forced to recognize that the leading strata of the pseudo-constitutional system were opposed to any broad reform.

From the 1890's on Czech and South Slav national politics were oriented toward the models of the Western democracies and established close ties with their leading personalities. Masaryk, Kramář and the South Slav politicians acquired an ever greater international reputation. Already at the turn of the century, Masaryk was determined to put an end to the existence of Austria (Cisleithania), since the Dualist form of state stood in the way of any realization of the Bohemian Staatsrecht. The South Slav question was likewise coming to represent an ever-growing threat to the monarchy.

Nevertheless, the reform politicians of Austria still hoped for a solution of all outstanding questions — above all the Bohemian — through a skillfully executed octroi. Minister Baernreither, as a member of the Count Clam-Martinic ministry worked out an octroi designed to offer a last-minute solution for the Bohemian question on the basis of language equality. The world-wide political convulsions of the year 1917 also doomed this attempt to failure.

ROOSEVELT AND THE SUDETEN QUESTION, A STUDY IN AMERICAN DIPLOMACY

James II. Wolfe

Meeting off the coast of Newfoundland in August, 1941, President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill agreed to a joint statement of foreign policy goals. Principal among these was a commitment to guarantee the right of national self-determination to all peoples as a basis for peace in the postwar world. Woodrow Wilson, too, in the tenth of his Fourteen Points, pledged his government to the ideal that every national group should determine its political allegiance. When confronted with the need to continue a wartime coalition as the foundation of a world organization, Wilson and Roosevelt succumbed to the Weberian ethic of ultimate
ends and sacrificed the principle of national self-determination in an effort to achieve global understanding among the Great Powers. The record of Rooseveltian diplomacy on the Sudeten German question reveals the tragedy of bowing to expediency in statecraft and is a case study of United States policy in Europe during World War II.

Decision theory through its emphasis on role, information, and motivation of the decision-maker offers the most suitable means of interpreting Roosevelt's attitude toward the Sudeten Germans. As Commander-in-Chief in a world-wide conflict Roosevelt was cast in his most formidable role, that of a Cincinnatus whose leadership could be challenged only in muted tones. The President's Sources of information on European affairs were uniform in that they excluded any input suggesting an amelioration of what Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson called a „crime against civilization“ — a Carthaginian peace for Germany. The motivation for this policy sprang from Roosevelt's fixation with the belief that German participation in world politics could only be a force for evil. Unlike that of the Soviet Union, American policy was limited to the prescription of the final destruction of a German actor in the international system. Accordingly, the Munich Agreement, which Roosevelt had once hailed as a victory for peace, was to be invalidated through the reconstitution of the pre-1938 Czecho-Slovak state. The leader of the Provisional Czecho-Slovak Government in London, Eduard Beneš, gained the confidence of American policy makers, as he had done a generation earlier at the Paris Peace Conference, and guided their thinking on the political reorganization of East Central Europe. Beneš strove to overcome American reluctance to approve the projected expulsion of the German population from its Bohemian and Moravian homeland. His opportunity came at the Anglo-American TRIDENT Conference (1943) when, by suggesting that he enjoyed Marshal Stalin's support, Beneš persuaded Roosevelt to sacrifice his promise of national self-determination and to acquiesce in the transfer of the Sudeten Germans rather than risk the cooperation of the Soviet Union in building a new world order.

REVISION AND EXPANSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE GOALS, METHODS AND PLANNING OF HITLER'S POLICY VIS-À-VIS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jörg K. Hoensch

The theses of a radical Darwinism which Hitler set forth in the second volume of Mein Kampf in 1926, using such catchwords as „Bodenerwerb“ and „Lebensraum“, and the fanatical racism which he elevated to the rank of an ideologized component of foreign policy seemed too unbelievable to be taken seriously by the responsible European politicians in the years before and shortly after the Nazi seizure of power. For Hitler, however, the CSR