ends and sacrificed the principle of national self-determination in an effort to achieve global understanding among the Great Powers. The record of Rooseveltian diplomacy on the Sudeten German question reveals the tragedy of bowing to expediency in statecraft and is a case study of United States policy in Europe during World War II.

Decision theory through its emphasis on role, information, and motivation of the decision-maker offers the most suitable means of interpreting Roosevelt’s attitude toward the Sudeten Germans. As Commander-in-Chief in a world-wide conflict Roosevelt was cast in his most formidable role, that of a Cincinnatus whose leadership could be challenged only in muted tones. The President’s Sources of information on European affairs were uniform in that they excluded any input suggesting an amelioration of what Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson called a „crime against civilization“ — a Carthaginian peace for Germany. The motivation for this policy sprang from Roosevelt’s fixation with the belief that German participation in world politics could only be a force for evil. Unlike that of the Soviet Union, American policy was limited to the prescription of the final destruction of a German actor in the international system. Accordingly, the Munich Agreement, which Roosevelt had once hailed as a victory for peace, was to be invalidated through the reconstitution of the pre-1938 Czecho-Slovak state. The leader of the Provisional Czecho-Slovak Government in London, Eduard Beneš, gained the confidence of American policy makers, as he had done a generation earlier at the Paris Peace Conference, and guided their thinking on the political reorganization of East Central Europe. Beneš strove to overcome American reluctance to approve the projected expulsion of the German population from its Bohemian and Moravian homeland. His opportunity came at the Anglo-American TRIDENT Conference (1943) when, by suggesting that he enjoyed Marshal Stalin’s support, Beneš persuaded Roosevelt to sacrifice his promise of national self-determination and to acquiesce in the transfer of the Sudeten Germans rather than risk the cooperation of the Soviet Union in building a new world order.

REVISION AND EXPANSION: REFLECTIONS ON THE GOALS, METHODS AND PLANNING OF HITLER’S POLICY VIS-À-VIS CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Jörg K. Hoensch

The theses of a radical Darwinism which Hitler set forth in the second volume of Mein Kampf in 1926, using such catchwords as „Bodenerwerb“ and „Lebensraum“, and the fanatical racism which he elevated to the rank of an ideologized component of foreign policy seemed too unbelievable to be taken seriously by the responsible European politicians in the years before and shortly after the Nazi seizure of power. For Hitler, however, the CSR
— as the most important pillar of the French system of pacts in East-Central Europe — had as early as the 1920’s wholly lost any right to exist.

After the radical transformation of the domestic scene and the consolidation of the regime in Germany, Hitler was able to proceed with the realization of his ideas in the foreign policy sphere. Thanks to his clear program and the consequent and unscrupulous way in which he pursued it, he managed — in an astonishingly short time, marked by bewildering shifts between continuity and new initiatives — to force the protagonists of an "appeasement policy" over to the defensive. A combination of promises and threats, treaty proposals and alliance offers, the cancellation of existing treaties and the conclusion of new ones helped him to undermine the system of collective security guaranteed by the League of Nations. Under Foreign Minister von Neurath an attempt was made to continue the traditional approach of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs aimed at a compromise solution. Hitler, however, supported by Rosenberg and Ribbentrop, increasingly forced the defenders of the status quo in Berlin into a corner. Beneš’ effort to appease the Reich failed, Hitler rejecting his offer of a non-aggression pact.

The wide prevalence of illusions abroad played no small role in preparing the way for the next phase marked by an active National Socialist foreign policy, which, after the Anschluss with Austria and the liquidation of the residual Czech State in March 1939, brought Hitler to the pinnacle of his personal power.

This article uses Hitler’s action against Czechoslovakia as a case-study for his foreign policy and strategy, methods and planning.

GERMAN PHILOSOPHY IN THE PRAGUE AREA SINCE BERNARD BOLZANO

Herbert Cysarz

This study presents the first comprehensive survey of the development of philosophy in the Bohemian lands from the 18th to 20th century. This development is at the same time part of the philosophy of old Austria, which ever since the Enlightenment spread through Western and Central Europe, had made numerous new departures of its own. It became involved in prolonged conflicts with the Catholic Church, whereas in Protestant Germany, as a result of the secularization of religion in classical, Romantic, idealistic poetry and philosophy (e. g. the reception of ancient polytheism or the free-thinking presentation of the world order), there were far fewer conflicts. Such conflicts were most pronounced in the Bohemian lands, where the spirit of the Reformation (as, for instance, in the “permanent reformism” of Comenius) and the inner rejection of the Counter Reformation continued to remain alive.

It was precisely in and around Prague that a scientific, analytical, less