# HITLER AND THE DNSAP

## Between Democracy and Gleichschaltung *

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We are accustomed to speaking of German National Socialism and Adolf Hitler in the same breath, as if to accept the proposition that the two were synonymous. Given the fact that Hitler exercised absolute domination over the movement during most of the period and that he was for many National Socialists the embodiment, the myth-person of the movement, there is much truth in this [1]. National Socialism as it came to prominence and power in Germany is unthinkable without Hitler.

But this was not always the case. As a set of ideas and attitudes, as a political organization, National Socialism pre-dates Hitler; and even after his entry into politics in 1919, there were a number of National Socialists who still regarded themselves as the center of the movement by virtue of their seniority, of their political experience and success, and of their ideological development [2]. These were the pioneers and their conception of National Socialism in the early years was far different than that of Hitler. They were the National Socialists of Bohemia (Czechoslovakia).

Eventually, certainly by 1923, these older Nazis would succumb to the personal appeal and dazzling regional success of Hitler and his branch of the movement and accept his leadership. But, even then, as they paid homage to Hitler as the Führer, they attached a very different meaning to the word than did the Nazis in Germany. For operating as they were in another country, both beyond the interest and direct influence of Hitler, they were able to hold on to much of their autonomy and independence in practice, and could cherish the not completely unjustified belief that they were still the senior Nazis, the conscience of the party, and the not always appreciated heralded outpost of the movement out on the borders of Germandom. Their course was, from the beginning, different from that of the Munich branch of the movement; their relationship with Hitler himself much more ambiguous than

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* This is a revised version of a paper presented at the annual convention of the American Historical Association in Dallas/Texas, December 27—30, 1977.

[1] On Hitler as „myth person", see Orlow, Dietrich: The History of the Nazi Party. Vol. I. Pittsburg 1969, pp. 1—10.

[2] For a discussion of pre-Hitlerian National Socialism, see Whiteside, Andrew G.: Austrian National Socialism before 1918. The Hague 1962; also idem: The Deutsche Arbeiter Partei 1904—1918: A Contribution to the Origins of Fascism. Austrian History Newsletter 4 (1963) 3—14. — On the post-war DNSAP and the problems of functioning within the context of Czechoslovakia, see article by Smelser, Ronald M.: Nazis without Hitler: The DNSAP and the First Czechoslovak Republic. East Central Europe. Vol. 4, Fasc. 1 (1977), pp. 1—19.

that of the Reich Nazis; indeed, it was, at least until 1923, and to an extent even for years thereafter quite a symbiotic relationship.

This symbiosis is significant for two reasons, which have bearing on understanding the rise of Hitler. First, it unterscores the importance of context. Certainly we recognize the unique importance of Hitler's personality and will. Perhaps so much so that we over-emphasize that factor and forget too easily that Hitler's unique talents were so effective precisely because they meshed with an environment in the early years uniquely suited to enhance them: post-war Bavaria, and in particular, Munich. Had that context been different — or had Hitler been elsewhere — National Socialism would have been a far different movement. The forgotten Nazis of Bohemia were one example of National Socialism out of such a salubrious context — just as in a far different way the National Socialism of Friedrich Naumann before the war was a far different phenomenon because of the context. All three, despite the differences, have in common an attempt to merge what Friedrich Meinecke called the „two great waves" of the nineteenth century — Nationalism and Socialism. That they are so different is largely a matter of context.

Secondly, the relationship of the Bohemian Nazis to Hitler is significant for what it contributed to him and his movement. Though he never acknowledged it subsequently, he owed them a great deal. Though he largely rejected their brand of National Socialism, their political style and conception of leadership, he found it necessary, especially after his abortive putsch in 1923, to return to the wellsprings of *their* National Socialism for sustenance. That he borrowed was a tacit, though never admitted, recognition that the Sudeten Nazis were the senior Nazis, the pioneers.

A few years earlier this seniority would have been perfectly apparent, and it is interesting to contrast the Bohemian Nazis with Hitler in 1919. On October 16, 1919, Hitler took the tiny DAP to the public for the first time with a rally scheduled at the Hofbräuhaus in Munich. He and other leaders of the party were worried that if only a handful of people showed up, the party would go broke. They need not have worried, for the party managed to collect enough that night to justify having rented the hall. In his maiden speech, Hitler addressed all of 111 people and discovered, by his own testimony: „I can speak [3]!"

At that same time leaders of the Bohemian Nazi Party, the DNSAP, were planning their party day to be held on November 15 in the city of Dux, Czechoslovakia [4]. They offered quite a contrast to their, as yet, obscure counterpart in Munich. As the 119 assembled delegates at the congress would hear, their party was doing quite well. Representatives were there from no less than 327 locals. Moreover, in the local elections which had been held in June, their party had garnered 50,000 votes and elected 618 people to local offices, including many mayors. The icing on the cake was the fact that they were celebrating the 16th anniversary of the found-

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[3] Toland, John: Adolf Hitler. New York 1977, p. 94.

[4] For a detailed discussion of this party day, see the Sudeten German National Socialist daily, Tag (Dux) no. 188, November 16, 1919.

ing of the party, which had not only survived the fall of the Habsburg Empire, but also a splintering that left a section of the original party trapped in the new, rump Austrian state, and the other in the newly created Czechoslovakian state. Despite these blows, the future seemed bright. The party had a solid social base amongst the craftsmen and skilled laborers of northern Bohemia and even a „Bible" of sorts: one of the party leaders, Rudolf Jung, had just published a book entitled *Der nationale Sozialismus* in which he laid out the world view of the movement [5]. Perhaps most importantly, these representatives took some pride in representing what they claimed to be a great *Weltanschauung* which would heal the split in German society and go on to realize the goal of a „free, socialist, Greater Germany". Indeed,they took pride in being the first free party in Austria to call for Anschluss and eagerly sought to recruit like-minded people in Germany. If any of them had been asked to identify the name — Adolf Hitler — at this point, the response would surely have been a blank look of bewilderment.

The Bohemian National Socialists were, however, looking across the border into the Reich; and what they were discovering there only gave further credence to their claim to be pioneers of National Socialism. For in various parts of Germany, groups and parties emerged advocating quite similar ideas. As far away as Königsberg in East Prussia, someone had read Jung's book and formed a local organization [6]. In Düsseldorf, an engineer named Alfred Brunner founded a political party which he called the *Deutschsoziale Partei* based upon the same ideas as the Bohemian party; soon DSP claimed locals scattered all over Germany. The one in Nuremberg was headed by one Julius Streicher [7].

In Munich, Anton Drexler, a machinist employed by the railroad, formed a political organization which he called, after the pre-war-Austrian party, the *Deutsche Arbeiterpartei*; his pamphlet, *My Political Awakening*, revealed again a close similarity in ideas to those of the Bohemian party. In this case, the affinity is not surprising. Both the new Munich group and the much older Bohemian party had a core of strength among the railwaymen — and given the old pre-war extraterritoriality of the railway between Germany and Austria, in particular as it passed through the rabidly nationalistic town of Eger, the Munich and Bohemian railwaymen probably had had a great deal of contact with each other for quite some years [8]. Interestingly enough, though, as the Bohemians looked across the border, they gave only passing, though pleased, notice to the founding of a like-minded organization in Munich. Munich, after all, was only one province. It was rather the DSP, which

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[5] Published in Troppau, Czechoslovakia.

[6] Deutsche Arbeiterpresse. Vienna (hereafter DAP), March 6, 1920.

[7] On the DSP, see NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 41, Folder 839 and Reel 4, Folder 109. — Maser, Werner: Die Frühgeschichte der NSDAP. Hitler's Weg bis 1924. Bonn 1965, pp. 227—233. — Franz-Willing, Georg: Die Hitler-Bewegung. Der Ursprung 1919—1922. Hamburg-Berlin 1962, pp. 88—93.

[8] For the radical, racial attitudes of the town of Eger, see Whiteside, Andrew Gladding: The Socialism of Fools. Georg Ritter von Schönerer and Austrian Pan-Germanism. Berkley-Los Angeles-London 1975, pp. 174—175. — Franz-Willing: Hitler-Bewegung 75—79; interestingly enough, the only two Sudeten Germans involved in the 1923 Hitler putsch were Egerländer. DAP, Jan. 5, 1924.

already had a national network, to which the DNSAP looked to as the real foundation of National Socialism in the Reich [9].

At this point, in dramatic contrast to the later Hitlerian period, National Socialism was to be an astounding degree, open, free, almost ecumenical in nature. Any group, party, or organization in Germany which espoused even vaguely similar ideas, under whatever name, was regarded as a kindred spirit, and as a fellow National Socialist. New groups, whatever the form their organization might take were welcomed into the fold almost with no questions asked, if they spoke the right ideological language [10]. Although firmly anchored in organizational form in Austria and Bohemia, National Socialism seemed in the minds of its adherents to be far more important as revolutionary ideal than as political form.

The content of the ideal was similar for all groups. All were unreservedly pan-German and envisioned a great German state which would dominate Mitteleuropa. All were anti-semitic, in that they saw the Jew as the main culprit in Germany's misfortune. Their language however was not yet as brutal as it would become; they contented themselves here in the early days with decrying the depredations of the „Jewish spirit" and spoke not yet of „Juda verrecke" [11]. Moreover, most of them were still caught up in the spirit of democratization and were generally run on a democratic basis; the general disillusionment with democracy as a form of government had not yet set in [12]. All were concerned centrally with the condition of the worker and with fitting him into the community of the nation. Above all, they were concerned with creating a Greater Germany, which would enable the borderland Germans to become part of a powerful German state. Their stance in advocating these things was a radical one, but their radicalism was more form than substance. Two things would keep it that way and make them so much different from the Hitlerian Nazis which would soon become prominent, first in Munich, then in Bavaria. One was a continuity from the pre-war period which had developed certain political behavior patterns which kept them from becomming too

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[9] First reference to „a National Socialist Party in Germany" in the DNSAP paper comes on July 18, 1919 (Tag, no. 94). The party is not named but the summary of its program makes it clear that the reference is to the DSP. From that point on the DSP is frequently mentioned in both the Sudeten and the Austrian Nazi press, e. g. in a column entitled „Aus Unserer Bewegung in Deutschland" in DAP, May 2, 1920.

[10] For example, the Sudeten Nazis heralded the presidential candidacy of the land reformer, Adolf Damaschke, in Germany and regarded him as one of their own. Tag, no. 155, October 8, 1919.

[11] See, for example, a speech by Jung at Lichnov on February 11, 1923, in which he advocates limiting Jews to a share in public life commensurate with their proportionate numbers in society. That the anti-semitism of the Bohemian Nazis was more „salonfähig" than that of the Munich Nazis is perhaps in part attributable to the fact that having a real enemy in the Czechs, they had not the same need for an „objective" enemy as did their brethren in Germany. Statný Ústřední Archiv, Prague, 11-HS-STF-no. 24 (hereafter SÚA). Even with its other enemies, the DNSAP press was far gentler than its Munich counterpart. In a series of articles profiling various Sudeten political leaders in 1922, Max Karg, editor of the Tag, even had a good word for the Communist leader, Karl Kreibich, whom he labelled as a courageous man and a great one who „never found his revolution". No. 76, May 19, 1922.

[12] See Smelser: Nazis Without Hitler 9—11.

overtly radical. The leaders of the party had matured politically in the context of the old *Reichsrat,* which although it had witnessed much violence within its walls, had nevertheless functioned as a parliamentary forum. Having to contend for decades verbally with their opponents made the DNSAP leaders much more inclined toward verbal sparring than toward street combat. Moreover, this political continuity also helped to mitigate the legacy of the war: a life of violence which in Germany moved easily from the trenches to the streets.

Secondly, the Bohemian National Socialists were functioning in a completely different immediate post-war context than were their confreres in the Reich. Munich had, after all, undergone serious social upheaval in the wake of war's end, with bloody internecine warfare and three socialist regimes within less than a year [13]. Bohemia by contrast had very quickly and relatively peacefully been occupied by Czech military with a dazed, shocked German population acquiescing reluctantly in the creation of a new state. The only revolution in Bohemia was the peaceful national revolution of the Czechs [14]. Thus, while a Freikorps-dominated *Ornungszelle Bayern* was drawing all the desultory radical right-wing groups in German society like a magnet, thereby creating the ideal climate for the emergence of a violent, putsch-oriented, and non-ideological National Socialist movement, the opposite situation obtained in Bohemia. The relatively peaceful transition from Hapsburg to Czech rule, the absence of social upheaval, the mere fact that the Germans found themselves a minority in someone else's country, only strengthened the force of continuity and prevented the Bohemian Nazis from moving in a radical, violent direction. If Hitler's NSDAP was the „spoiled darling" of the Bavarian Government, the DNSAP was the closely watched, potentially treasonable faction in Czechoslovakian politics. The Sudeten Nazis thus found themselves cast into a „legalistic" framework already in 1918 that Hitler would not have to contend with until after his abortive putsch five years later.

One of the most dramatic contrasts arising from the differences in content between the two branches of the movement lay in the nature of the leadership of the two groups after Hitler had become an important figure in Munich. The Munich leaders were a much more heterogeneous group: they ranged from a strong ex-soldier component, veterans, Freikorps activists of the Roehm and von Salomon type; to the declassé, men of some social standing whose position in society had been undermined by the war, the Göring and Himmler sort; to the emigrés, those like Rosen-

[13] The best treatment of the post-war Munich and Bavarian political situation is Gordon, Harold J. (jr.): Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch. Princeton 1972, chapters 1—7; more specifically on Hitler and the early DAP, see Phelps, Reginald: Hitler und die Deutsche Arbeiterpartei. American Historical Review 68 (1963) 976—986; also Phelps: Anton Drexler, der Gründer der NSDAP. Deutsche Rundschau 87 (1961) 1136—1137). — Especially on the uniqueness of the Munich context, see Fishman, Sterling: The Rise of Hitler as a Beer Hall Orator. Review of Politics 26 (1964) 244—256. — Franz, Georg: Munich: Birthplace and Center of the National Socialist German Worker's Party. Journal of Modern History 29 (1957) 319—334.

[14] For a brief, recent sketch of the Czech national revolution of 1918, see Mamatey, Victor S.: The Establishment of the Republic. In: Mamatey, Victor S. / Luža, Radomír (eds.): A History of the Czechoslovak Republic 1918—1948. Princeton 1973, pp. 3—38.

berg and Scheubner-Richter, who brought with them the violent ideological resentments engendered by their fear of the Russian revolution and all it had unleashed [15]. What made this diverse collection of rootless and violent men even more radical was the fact that unlike the Bohemian leaders, they had no political experience behind them, and thus no preconceived ideas about political behavior. Accordingly, they could put within the framework of politics the fears, resentments and frustations that marked post-war German society without the constraints of previously developed behavior patterns. The fact that in addition the Munich Nazis were overwhelmingly young only exacerbated the tendency toward radicalism [16].

The Bohemian leaders, already active for years in politics, were, as a group, strikingly different. They tended to fall into two groups, reflecting the Austrian background of the movement: The „intellectuals" and the labor leaders [17]. This breakdown, to be sure, caused many an ideological quarrel in the party. The labor agitators like Hugo Simm, Rudolf Kasper and Adam Fahrner who defined the DNSAP rather strictly as a class party often found themselves at odds with the „intellectuals" like Jung himself, who tried to broaden the definition of worker to include just about everybody. But this ideological push-pull aside, these men are nothing like the declassé condottiere who flourished in Munich. The Bohemians had roots, were older, possessed a reliable clientele, and were mired down in older behavior patterns which, along with the environment in which they were operating, prevented any radicalism from surfacing that even vaguely resembled that in Munich.

Many differences emerge in the approach of the two respective groups to politics as well. For one thing, the DNSAP was profoundly ideological during these early years, while the Munich branch of the movement was in its day to day activities virtually bereft of any ideological foundation beyond an arsonal of evocative slogans. The DNSAP had been concerned from the beginning about the content of National Socialism. The first reaction on the part of the leadership in assessing the election results of the Austrian *Nationalrat* in 1919 and its poor performance (this was the last election in which the Austrian and Bohemian National Socialists would candidate as one party) was to conclude that they needed to increase the size of the party press, undertake serious organizational work, but above all, to develop a sound theoretical foundation for the movement [18]. Moreover, in the frequent party caucuses and congresses, most of the time was spent in endless theoretical debates over doctrine. Are we a class party or not? How should we define

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[15] Gordon: Beer Hall Putsch, Chapter 3.

[16] Ibidem 68—71.

[17] For biographical information on the DNSAP leaders, see SÚA, Prague 11-HS-STF-no. 24; also Berlin Document Center: Personalakte Rudolf Kasper; also biographical sketches in Tag, no. 102, May 8, 1920 („Die Gewählten Mandatare Unserer Partei") and (on Jung specifically) no. 99, May 5, 1920. — Rudolf Brandstötter notes that even before the war the labor people in the party tried to draw a sharp line between themselves and the „bürgerlichen" and feared that the party was falling into the hands of intellectuals and academics: Dr. Walter Riehl und die Geschichte der DNSAP in Österreich. Unpublished dissertation. Vienna 1968, pp. 83—84, 94—95.

[18] See DAP, Marchl, 1919. — Brandstötter: Riehl 149—150.

our socialism? How far should we go in demanding nationalization of industry? Questions like this dominated the agenda of party gatherings and were taken quite seriously [19]. It was partly as a result of this debate that Jung attempted his theoretical work (*Der nationale Sozialismus*) which he intended to play a role in National Socialism similar to that of *Das Kapital* in Marxism. His book fell far short of the scope and insight of Marx, relecting the relative intellectual merits of the two men, but that he attempted it at all bears witness to the basically ideological thrust of this variety of National Socialism, and unlike Hitler's later book, *Mein Kampf*, Jung's is a serious attempt to elaborate ideology rather than an extended autobiography written in aggressive rhetorical style [20]. This strong emphasis on ideology and doctrine stems in large part from how these National Socialists defined their movement in the years just after the war. To them, trapped in a state not of their own making, anxious for any sign of like-minded people across the border in the Reich, and really quite helpless to do anything practical to realize their dream of a Greater Germany, National Socialism was primarily an „idea" which existed apart from any single group or organization which might try to embody it.

The Bohemian Nazis also differed considerably from the Munich ones in how they disseminated their ideas. Partly as a result of their somewhat more contemplative, ideological stance, the DNSAP still used, to a great degree, the dicussion group as its main political format and, at the same time, relied very heavily on the printed word.

A glance at the week's activities column in the main party paper gives one a good idea of the level on which they were working: discussion evenings in taverns predominate, closely followed by concerts, turner demonstrations and lectures [21]. It ist precisely that Verein-ism which Hitler found to be so contemptible in the DAP before he took it over, and indeed resembles greatly the backroom meetings of the pre-Hitlerian Munich party. There is nothing here of the wild, brawling political happenings which characterized the typical Nazi rally in Munich.

The DNSAP, by 1922, could boast a considerable press, including eleven newspapers, mostly on the country and district level [22]. Their total circulation varied between 3,000 and 6,000. The party relied heavily on this means of communication to get across its ideas. Indeed, it was part of the party constitution that each

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[19] Typical is the lengthy discussion of the concepts „nationalization" and „socialization" in Tag, no. 191, November 20, 1919.

[20] Maser notes, for example, that many passages in: Mein Kampf are not attempts to argue for a specific point of view, but rather „protocols" of Hitlerian speeches held before true believers in prior years. Hitler, Adolf: Mein Kampf. München 1966, pp. 119—120.

[21] The very first issue of Tag (March 22, 1919) states frankly that although many party members want ideological articles, most readers won't be party members and therefore the paper must cast a wide net in terms of feuilleton, serial novels, public interest announcements, etc. in order to breaden circulation.

[22] For an overview of the DNSAP press, see Linz, Norbert: Der Aufbau der Deutschen Politischen Presse in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik (1918—1925). BohJb 2 (1970) 289—292.

pg had to subscribe to one of them. But again, the papers scarcely have the tone of a *Kampfbewegung*. In an attempt to disseminate the National Socialist idea as broadly as possible, the papers included everything from *feuilleton* to community affairs announcements to pot boiling novels in serial form. The whole tenor was by and large quite *spießbürgerlich* and oppressively provincial for a movement that was demanding a „free, social Greater Germany". Even the leadership recognized this; at the second party day in Troppau in September 1920, there was much criticism of the main party organ, *Der Tag*, and the suggestion was made that it be transferred to a larger city than Dux in order to overcome its provinciality [23].

The Munich Nazis, to be sure, had their VB, but it was mainly a backup for Hitler's main tool in gaining followers: the mass rally and the spoken word. The story of Hitler's masterful use of that uniquely Munich political institution of the beer hall is too familiar to need relating here. But one should underscore the point that unlike the Sudeten Nazis with their relatively peaceful meetings and endless ideological bantering in the press, the Munich NS were far more interested in arousing the mass emotions through appeal by shouted slogan and manipulated terror than in discussing any ideas with anyone [24].

Once more, the differing contexts are important; the relatively stable, quite provincial environment of Bohemia where a newly created Czechoslovak government watched closely for any manifestations of German radicalism contrasts strikingly with revolution-torn Munich with its circus atmosphere and a climate salubrious to emotional appeal and rightwing violence. The DNSAP simply did not have the two vital ingredients that characterized Hitler's movement in Munich; theatrics and terror.

It was not only in their method of proseletizing, but also in other kinds of political activity that the two branches of National Socialism differed. The DNSAP, trapped within a system which did not permit paramilitary activity, was forced to keep to its pre-war tradition of fighting its battles verbally within the framework of a representative government. Unlike the NSDAP in Munich, it was unable to develop the military wing, the equivalent of the SA, which drive Hitler's movement so inexorably toward putschism [25]. Moreover, given the growing post-war role of the state as dispenser of patronage, the party also spent a great deal of its

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[23] Ibidem 291.

[24] It is interesting to compare the relative strength of the Munich and Bohemian branches of the movement through the relative circulation of their main paper. The Tag never topped 8500, a figure it reached in 1925. That figure represented a low for the Völkischen Beobachter [hereafter VB] (in late 1921 and early 1922) which ranged from 11,000 in 1921 to 17,500 in mid-1922 to over 25,000 in mid-1923. It never sank below 7,500. See Linz: Aufbau 291. — Orlow: Nazi Party I, 22. — Sidman, Charles F.: Die Auflagen-Kurve des Völkischen Beobachters und die Entwicklung des National-Sozialismus. Dezember 1920—November 1922. VfZ 13 (1965) 112—118.

[25] See Gordon: Beer Hall Putsch 62—63; only much later, in 1929, as the magnetic appeal of the Hitler party became overwhelming, did the DNSAP try to set up something modelled on the very earliest form of an SA, the Volkssport. See: Volkssportprozeß. Aussig 1932, an NS publication containing partial transcripts of the trial of seven Sudeten Germans in August—September, 1932.

time lobbying for its constituents [26]. These limitations on its activity determined that its political stance would be basically one of patient waiting, its approach evolutionary, relying on the eventuality that circumstances would become more propitious for the realization of its goals. It found itself, then, almost against its will, being integrated into the ongoing political system.

The NDSAP in Munich on the other hand, finding itself within a state virtually universally reviled and in an atmosphere conducive to violent activity, could convince itself that political activity involving immediate, violent confrontation with the state might bring it success [27]. Its approach to politics consequently was impatient and revolutionary. This contrast, in turn, helps to explain the difference between the two groups with respect to ideology: the NSDAP with nowhere to go and nothing to lose and everything to gain, whose worst enemy was time, and least conspicuous quality patience, had no need for an ideological foundation to carry it through the wilderness.

The radically different contexts in which they functioned helps to explain one other basic difference between the two segments of National Socialism. One can argue endlessly about the class base of the NSDAP; its *bunte Mischung* gives evidence for many interpretations [28]. The social base of the DNSAP was much less ambiguous. The DNSAP was very much wedded to a class base, and although it sought to recruit Germans of all backgrounds in Bohemia, the core of its support remained what it had been before the war — the workers and handicraftsmen of northern Bohemia. Reflecting this base, the DNSAP took very seriously its task of winning the worker over to nationalism and to attacking the excesses of capitalist society. Its close associations with nationalist unions underscored this orientation. By contrast, the indecisiveness shown by Hitler on the occasions of the Munich railway strike of May, 1922, betrayed the fact that the NSDAP had no clear position on the problems of labor [29].

The decision-making process in the two groups was also radically different. The DNSAP, although it came to reject western-style parliamentarism, and, in bitterness after the war, often the idea of democracy itself, still, in its day-to-day practice, functioned in a relatively democratic way. All party leaders were elected democratically and the annual party congress, to which delegates were also elected, was regarded as the ultimate decision-making body, the source of authority in the party. Moreover, those who guided the destinies of the party from day to day always functioned as a collective leadership. No one of them dominated in any-

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[26] See Smelser: Nazis without Hitler 14.

[27] A number of observers have noted that by 1923, the NSDAP had given up any intentions of being a parliamentary party and had devoted itself entirely to putschism. See Kele: Nazis and Workers. Chapel Hill / North Carolina 1972, p. 64. — Hale, Oron J.: Gottfried Feder calls Hitler to Order: An unpublished Letter on Nazi Party Affairs. Journal of Modern History 30 (1958) 359—362.

[28] Gordon argues convincingly that debate over the class composition of the Nazi party and its supporters misses the point; that its success lay in the fact that it was a party against class and class division. Beer Hall Putsch 71—86. — Fest, Joachim: Hitler. New York 1974, pp. 154—155.

[29] Maser: Frühgeschichte 337—340.

thing like the fashion that Hitler did in Munich. Nor had anyone of them the will, personality or intent to become what Hitler did in Munich by at least mid-1921 — the embodiment of the movement, its myth person. As one DNSAP leader, Alexander Schilling, noted on the occasion of Jung's election to the Prague Parliament: „It is not the business of our party to develop a cult of personality. The idea of National Socialism is anchored in hearts and brains, is carried by the spirit of the times and not in a pair of eyes, hands and legs. Far be it from us to see this electoral victory as a personal success on the part of the candidate . . . [30]." It is perhaps because they did not aspire as Hitler did, that they failed to see where he was going or to realize the true nature of his demands. Konrad Heiden, an early observer of both groups, noted with some contempt that Jung had not caught on to the new Führer-principle yet. He quotes Jung as urging pgs in Berlin, Leipzig and elsewhere to *stand by Hitler* in building up the movement throughout Germany. *To subordinate themselves to Hitler* would have been far more accurate from Hitler's point of view, Heiden suggests. To be sure, Heiden observes shrewdly, the Sudetens accept Hitler as the leader of the movement, but „in the urbane form of the modern club" and not in the complete fanatical subordination which Hitler envisions [31]. This difference in approach to decision making — and above all, the degree to which the Bohemian Nazis misunderstood their position vis-a-vis Hitler would create problems between the two.

One more related difference, finally, distinguished the two parties: that of self-image. The DNSAP leaders were always quite ecumenical. Although they certainly saw themselves as pioneers of National Socialism, they at no time regarded themselves as its exclusive representatives. On the contrary, they welcomed all those of even remote like-mindedness into the fold. They saw the DNSAP as only the spearhead of a National Socialist idea which other groups could accept and still keep their own organizational integrity. The DNSAP sought allies and were not terribly discriminating about where they found them. At times, it seemed that any group which spoke in *völkisch* terminology was acceptable. Nor did the DNSAP people try to impose their will on the other groups; usually they thought in terms of a loose alliance, and fully recognized that different areas had different problems which could only be solved by those immediately involved [32]. And even when they thought in terms of creating a unified organization, it was meant to be one of co-equals, not one to be dominated by one faction, much less by one man. Again, as Heiden noted, Jung was always giving the Munich party advice as to which groups they might ally with. These included everyone from the Pan-German League to the German Nationalist Association of Retail Clerks. „This suggestion of Jung's for a cartell", Heiden noted, „came from a hopelessly parliamentary

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[30] Tag, no. 90, April 22, 1920.

[31] Heiden, Konrad: Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus. Die Karriere einer Idee. Berlin 1932, pp. 101—103.

[32] DNSAP leader, Alexander Schilling, for example, envisioned an alliance among such diverse groups as land reformers („Freiland und Freiwirtschaft"); currency reformers („Brechung der Zinsknechtschaft"); völkisch religious reformers and anti-semites. See article in Tag, no. 156, July 27, 1920.

brain and smelled much too much like deputies club and slates of candidates. Hitler was furious [33]." Undaunted, Jung tried to bring about an amalgamation of the DSP, which had its strength in northern Germany, and the NSDAP in Munich. The terms he envisioned are interesting in that they indeed reflect his naivete about the nature of Hitler's party. Part of the unifying agreement was to be that the DSP group, responsible for organizing north Germany, would determine the presiding officer; the NSDAP, which was assigned southern Germany, would determine the vice-presiding officer, the reason being that the DSP had 60 Ortsgruppen, while the NSDAP had only 20. As he left the conference at which the terms were proposed, Jung considered the unification as „beschlosssene Sache" contingent upon formal agreement by the Munich people [34]. How little did he know Hitler at this point! One DSP sympathizer residing in Munich had a much clearer picture of the „new" National Socialist politics. Addressing himself to the question of who should absorb whom, he wrote to a colleague in the north: „The development of the Hitlerian N.D.A.O. [sic] has shown that it alone in the national socialist movement has a right to exist. Show me a locality which in the course of one year has staged 45 mass meetings. The Munich group did precisely that in 1921. The Munich group now counts over 2500 members and about 45000 sympathizers. Does any one of you have even remotely that many [35]?"

And even as Jung was returning to Czechoslovakia, congratulating himself on his mediation, the leader of the DSP was seeing the handwriting on the wall: „All the factors", Alfred Brunner wrote, „which I cannot reiterate here lead me to the conclusion that we must join the National Socialists at our next party day ... We must see the light and make an end of it. It is a fact, that most of our DSP *Ortsgruppen* haven't managed to get beyond a *Vereinsmeierei.* We lack powerful speakers and a powerful personality with total commitment. We are all too tied down. My own business activities take up nearly all my time. I am constantly on the road ..."

But his vision was only partly accurate. He adds that „therefore we shall have to make the best of it with Hitler. I mean we don't have to fear him and I hope that the DSP people will be strong enough in the organization [Verein!] to put some limits on the Hitler people. As the movement gets larger, others will emerge as a counterweight to a party papacy developing [36]."

Four months later in July, 1921, Hitler established his total and dictatorial control over the party [37]. Both Hitler's putsch in the party as well as his idea of what the relationship between the NSDAP and other groups should be dramatically illu-

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[33] Heiden: Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 101.

[34] See Jung's remarks in the official report of the Third Conference of the DSP, March 26—28, 1921 in Zeitz. NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 4, Folder 109; also Tag, no. 51, April 1, 1921.

[35] Sesselmann (?) to Wriedt (Kiel), February 8, 1921 in NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 41, Folder 839.; Wriedt founded the DSP local in Kiel after reading Jung's book. Maser: Frühgeschichte 89.

[36] Brunner to Wriedt (Kiel), March 17, 1921. NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 41, Folder 839.

[37] On the summer crisis of 1921 and Hitler's take over, see Fest: Hitler 146 ff. — Franz-Willing: Hitlerbewegung 103—125. — Maser: Frühgeschichte 266 ff.

strate how the self-image of the Munich group differed from that of the Bohemian Nazis. For Hitler, the party was an elite vanguard of fighters who wanted not allies, but total submission to Hitler and submersion into the NSDAP. As Hitler put it graphically, in direct opposition to Jung (and incidentally to Drexler as well, who supported Brunner's plan for a united party): „Its the greatest mistake to believe that a movement becomes stronger through uniting with other similarly constituted groups. Any growth which proceeds in this manner means initially, to be sure, an outward increase in numbers and in the eyes of a superficial observer, also an increase in power. As a matter of fact, however, the movement is only sowing the seeds of a later internal weakness [38]."

All these differences generated quite a bit of antagonism between the Bohemian (and Austrian) branches of the movement in the early years, as both direct and indirect evidence attests.

A dissertation written in 1931 from a pronouncedly Nazi point of view notes that, during the summer of 1921 and after, the Sudeten-Austrian group stood in quite a hostile relationship with Munich. Any sense of brotherhood, the author notes, had been „illusory" and continued to be so. „In the course of early 1922", he continued, „there were in part quite pronounced differences between Troppau-Vienna and Munich" to the point where Hitler considered setting up his own locals in Austria. Of course, he could not have done so in Czechoslovakia [39].

The Bohemian Nazi press also betrayed the rancor which often developed as the Sudetens took issue with both Hitler's methods and his claims to dominance. On pondering the tasks of the liaison office linking the Nazi groups in Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia, the so-called „Interstate Chancellery" (*zwischenstaatliche Kanzlei*) in July 1921, Schilling, a prominent DNSAP leader, likened the movement to different marching columns which should be able to march separately as well as together. „The center", he continued, „must be aware of the needs of the flanks. The center [Munich] must not only be aware of its own needs, but allow the flanks (Sudeten and Austrian) to be themselves [40]."

Perhaps the most critical response on the part of the Sudeten leaders to Munich and its activities came in the wake of Hitler's putsch within the party in Juli, 1921, in which he seized dictatorial power. In a lead article *Tag* entitled „Which Way?", the DNSAP leadership took issue with the entire direction in which Munich was going [41]. It contrasted what it termed the „unnatural" way toward National Socialism with the „natural". The unnatural way is the striving for instant, visible success by any and all means. It has to do with numbers, with superficiality, with primitive drives. „This way carries the seeds of its own destruction. It leads by

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[38] Maser: Frühgeschichte 246; Hitler issued a leaflet in December, 1921, explaining why none of his people attending the DSP congress in Magdeburg. He contrasts his „fest und straff organisierte" NSDAP with the DSP and criticizes the trend toward casual amalgamation in the völkisch movement. Ibidem 173.

[39] Hasselbach, Ulrich von: Die Entstehung der National-Sozialistischen Deutschen Arbeiterpartei, 1919—1923. Unpublished dissertation. Leipzig 1931, pp. 32 ff. NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 4, Folder 107.

[40] Tag, no. 101, July 5, 1921.

[41] Ibidem no. 126, August 19, 1921.

way of intoxicating heights into an abyss, and carries the good elements along with it." The other way, the natural way, seeks a gradual fruition over time, seeks with responsible behavior the attainable with a clear awareness of the givens. The article goes on to warn about demagoguery, citing the Social Democrats as examples: „The working people don't want false gods any more", rather, they want men „the courage of whose convictions does not find its impetus in a horde of bought and paid for roughnecks . . . It is the duty of us National Socialists to stick responsibly with the natural way and keep out of our movement, and dislodge from the saddle, everything uncreative, everything tawdry and everything egoistical that threatens to snatch rights above the party."

In private, too, the DNSAP leaders warned about the direction in which Munich was going. On October 1, 1921, Jung wrote the following to Julius Streicher, whom he still hoped to win over: „You can only explain the attitude of the Munich group by the fact that they've been hoping to change the course in Germany at one stroke from Bavaria. Hitler should know by now that these hopes have dissipated and must take steps to slowly build the movement in order at least to marke it a serious factor in the political life of the German Reich [42]."

Jung was right. In the putsch attempt two years later, Hitler tried precisely to alter the course of Germany in one stroke. Again, the reaction from Bohemia was very critical. A lead article in *Tag* noted: „Hitler's putsch in Munich was, then, an ill-considered-act, a failure to recognize political realities, a serious tactical mistake. Perhaps this mistake means the political — perhaps even actual — death of Hitler . . . but no idea and no Weltanschauung can be destroyed by a tactical mistake. National Socialism will and must live on — independent of individual fates, and march on with iron determination [43]."

Jung, of course, had warned about such folly before. On August 29, just a little over two months before the beer hall putsch, he had written the following words to his Austrian comrades: „Listen to sound advice: you are much too caught up in putschism. Already in the past, it has struck me unpleasantly — and unlike you, I have had to bear the consequences — how much you proclaim the national revolution at your rallies. Now don't take it amiss, but it is a fact that announced revolutions never take place. In the last analysis, those kinds of things invariably lead to the movement falling under the curse of ridiculousness. And that is more dangerous than the animosity of our enemies [44]."

Whatever their tactical criticisms might have been the Bohemian Nazis certainly did not abandon Hitler; they visited him frequently in Landsberg, offered advice, and still recognized him as the leader [45]. That loyalty might seem strange in light of the fiasco for the movement of November 9 — but in fact, make complete sense, given the position of the Sudeten branch of the movement. For it was not just the

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[42] Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung, no. 305.

[43] Tag, no. 199, November 13, 1923. That they were able to deal with Hitler's political demise so easily, separating the movement from his person, indicates that they were not as engaged in the myth person as were the Munich Nazis.

[44] Jung to Schulz, National Archives Microcopy T-84, 5, 3979.

[45] See Jung Denkschrift, n. d., but probably 1940 in Bundesarchiv, Schumacher Sammlung, p. 313.

mushroom growth of the Munich branch, or the power of Hitler's will and personality which made the Bohemians accept Hitler's leadership [46]. The acceptance of Reich leadership was implicit in the movement from the very beginning. The Bohemian (and Austrian) Nazis *sought* leadership from the Reich because their *großdeutsch* tenet made them do so. If a Greater German Reich were ever to come into being, there had to be a strong National Socialist movement in Germany, for only Germany, not rump Austria or submerged Bohemia could bring about *Großdeutschland*. Hence, from the very beginning, the Bohemians saw their task as creating in Germany a branch of the movement which would someday take leadership of the great cause. In a sense, if there had been no Hitler, the Bohemian Nazis would have had to create him. Very early on, in August, 1919, the *DAP* wrote that „the national socialist movement in the Reich is our hope. It will become strong, seize leadership unto itself and everything will work out all right [47]." A year later, the DNSAP leader, Alexander Schilling, noted that: „Without a corresponding sounding aboard in the Reich, in the motherland, our party will always be condemned to play the role of lost outpost, cut off from the center [48]." Some months later, as the Sudetens were reflecting on the meaning of their recent gathering in Salzburg, their paper observed that for two years now they have been citizens of a state and have had to learn how ineffectual their words are against Czech bayonets. Help could only come from elsewhere.

„In this way, the National Socialist movement in Germany has become a matter of life and death, not only for the party, but for Germandom in Czechoslovakia as a whole. If Germany sinks, so will the Germans in this country; if National Socialism whose seed we have transplanted to Germany, goes under, then the National Socialist party of Czechoslovakia will again sink to the level of a more or less sizable party, but which will not have more than local significance [49]."

So quite consistently, even before Hitler took over the movement in Germany and brought it to prominence, the Sudeten Nazis were looking to Germany as the ultimate context in which a branch of the movement would develop, to which they could eventually pass on the mantle of leadership. But in their efforts to transplant and nurture a Reich branch of the movement, they always insisted on their own definitions, their own independence, as the pioneers of the movement. They steadfastly claimed the status of „senior Nazis", maintained their distance and were more critical than anyone in Munich world have dared. In short, they remained guardians of the National Socialist idea. And this remained true even after Hitler seized control of the party and made it a political factor in Bavaria.

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[46] The NSDAP experienced mushroom growth from late 1922 through much of 1923, a growth which dwarfed the Bohemian branch of the movement. In January, 1922, there were still only 6,000 NSDAP members. By November, 1923, the numbers had increased to 55, 587 members, 35,000 of whom joined during 1923. Similarly, the party only had 45 locals in summer, 1922; by mid-1923 there were 347. — Maser: Frühgeschichte 328—329. — Franz-Willing: Hitlerbewegung 177. — Fest: Hitler 161.

[47] August 2, 1919.

[48] Tag, no. 156, July 27, 1921.

[49] Tag, no. 6, January 11, 1921.

In retrospect, to have made such a claim seems to be sheer affrontery, even in 1923. To have continued to make them, as Jung did all the way down to 1933 seems to be sheer madness. After all, Hitler became, briefly, a key figure in world history in the twentieth century. Rudolf Jung pales to insignificance next to the man who brought National Socialism to power in Germany and then proceeded to rock Europe and the world before he and his movement were destroyed in a devastating war. And yet, the evidence suggests that Hitler owed a great deal to these „forgotten Nazis", in particular during the early days, but later on as well.

To assert Hitler's indebtedness to the Bohemian Nazis is, in a sense, to tread on thin ice, for the evidence for this contention is predominantly circumstantial. For one thing, Hitler never acknowledged his debt, for another, most of what the senior Nazis wrote later on about the old days is an obvious attempt to curry favor after Hitler came to dominate Germany [50]. Documentary evidence is slim. However, the following factors in combination suggested strongly that Hitler owed a great deal to the „forgotten" Nazis.

Hitler did not hesitate to acknowledge debts when it was to his advantage to do so. He admitted how much he had learned from the Left about mass agitation — but that was by way of ridiculing the left for their failure to fully exploit those techniques [51]. He dedicated the first volume of *Mein Kampf* to the fallen on November 9 — but they were dead and made convenient martyrs for the movement, while obviously representing no threat. Volume two, he dedicated to his old mentor, Dietrich Eckhart, but Eckhart had died in prison and likewise offered no threat [52]. But nowhere does Hitler even so much as mention the Bohemian Nazis subsequently; nowhere in *Mein Kampf* do they appear; nowhere in his rambling Table Talk later on, in which he touches upon every other conceivable topic, do the Bohemian Nazis receive even passing mention [53]. He never mentions them precisely because he owes them more than he cares to admit.

Other contemporary testimony does bear out his indebtedness. Konrad Heiden, certainly no friend of National Socialism, noted how much the Bohemian Nazis, and especially Jung, had contributed to Hitler in the way of ideology, especially with respect to asserting links between Bolshevism, Democracy and the Jews [54]. Ernst Lüdecke, one of Hitler's early followers and an active fund raiser for the movement, pointed out later the importance of the Bohemian Nazis for National Socialism: his introduction to them „enabled me for the first time to look at the German Nazi movement with the broader view, from the outside. We were, after all, not an isolated phenomenon, but an organic development of an impulse that

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[50] A good example is a Denkschrift written by Hans Krebs and dated October 24, 1940, in which he asserts that DNSAP people fought for unification under Hitler of the DSP and the Theodor Fritsch group at a meeting in Saxony in early 1922. Given the position of the DNSAP leadership at that time, this statement was simply not true. Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung, pp. 312.

[51] See Hitler: Mein Kampf, 378th printing. Munich 1938, pp. 528—547.

[52] Ibidem Frontispiece.

[53] See Norman Cameron and R. H. Stevens (trans.) with an introduction by Trevor-Roper: Hitler's Secret Conversations 1941—1944. New York 1953.

[54] See Heiden: Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 35—36.

for years had existed everywhere among the German people [55]." Significantly, Lüdecke's first fund raising trip abroad — to the United States — was undertaken through the initiative of the „Interstate Chancellory". His letter of introduction was signed by Jung and Riehl [56]. Subsequent observers have noted, too, the many contributions made by the borderland Nazis to the Hitler movement in the early days [57]. Documentary evidence shows that from very early on, connections between the Sudeten Nazis and Munich were extensive, not only through the formal mechanism of the „Interstate Chancellory", but also including a far-reaching speaker exchange, financial aid and tactical advice [58]. But the most compelling evidence for Hitler's debt to the Sudetens in particular, lies in the fact that after Landsberg, his situation was strikingly similar to what theirs had been all along, and that subsequently his tactics closely paralleled what theirs had been. In an inhospitable environment consisting of political stability, economic upturns and a hostile state, both groups had to be radical enough to attract and keep a hard core of followers, but not so overtly radical as to overstep the fine line that separated official tolerance from crackdown. The situation demanded, moreover, the ability to speak radically and in emotional language, but not specifically enough to draw the accusation of treason. It demanded participation in a parliamentary system, if only as a platform to express views hostile to that system. It demanded learning the trick of allying temporarily with conservatives without being identified with or coopted by them [59]. Above all, it demanded a solid ideological foundation to tide them over a quiescent period in the wilderness until such time as the prospect of power was credible [60].

The Sudeten Nazis, having to function in Czechoslovakia, were past masters at all these things. Moreover, as we have seen, they were never loathe to pass on advice to Munich, even when conditions there were far different from their own. Now that conditions were similar, they could hardly have refrained from pointing

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[55] Lüdecke, Ernst: I Knew Hitler. London 1938, p. 127.

[56] Ibidem 185—186; photograph of „Vollmacht und Legitimation" opposite p. 191.

[57] See especially Maser: Frühgeschichte 237—238; even Hasselbach admits indirectly that the movement profited from the ideas of men like Jung. He refers specifically to the working plan of a „Commitee on Nourishment" printed in the VB of July 14, 1922, in which ideas like prohibition of land speculation, exclusion of foreign capital from German agriculture, anti-capitalist laws on housing and rural settlement are proposed. See: Entstehung 35.

[58] From 1920 on, Munich and Sudeten Nazi speakers often shared the stage at rallies. Police reports as well as NSDAP record books offer evidence for this fact. Bayerisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Munich, Abteilung I, Sonderabgabe I, no. 1478 and no. 1495. — See also police report of November 30, 1922, in NSDAP Hauptarchiv. Roll 22 A, Folder 1754; Hasselbach: Entstehung 35 also indicates a frequent exchange of speakers; as to frequent references in Tag, e. g. no. 64, April 26, 1921; no. 84, June 4, 1921; no. 38, March 8, 1921; no. 118, August 2, 1922; no. 17, January 31, 1923, no. 21, February 7, 1923. On financial aid, see letter from Riehl to Drexler of August 31, 1920, in NSDAP Hauptarchiv, Reel 4, Folder 108.

[59] As, for example, in the cooperative agitation for a plebiscite against the Young Plan in 1929 and the Harzburg front. See Fest: Hitler 273 ff.

[60] One example here might well be the so-called „urban plan" of the NSDAP in 1926—1928. — See Orlow: Nazi Party, Chapter IV.

this fact out. Indeed, both Jung and Knirsch frequently visited Hitler in Landsberg [61]. It has been suggested, in fact, that Knirsch was one of those who helped pull Hitler out of his despair [62]. Part of this attempt might well have been by way of sharing experiences and painting a picture of how the movement might go from its nadir to build a solid base in Germany. Given Hitler's propensity to learn from friend and foe alike, there is reason to assume that he saw the parallel between his branch of the movement and theirs, and acted accordingly.

There is little doubt that the Sudeten Nazis saw things that way and perceived themselves as Hitler's schoolmasters. They continued to give advice freely, as they always had, and indeed were convinced that the Munich branch of the movement was becoming more similar to their own because of their influence.

This is especially the case with Jung, who corresponded regularly with Gregor Strasser and tried to mediate when Gregor's brother, Otto, bolted the NSDAP in 1930. Jung's words to Otto, urging him to return to the fold, reflected his image of the role played by the Sudeten Nazis vis-a-vis the Reich branch of the movement: „There is no doubt in my mind that the Reich party, as a matter of course, is travelling the same path as ours has. We were of this opinion already years ago and for that reason did not take all too seriously various remarks. The Reich party which at the beginning *only wanted to be a movement* has been compelled to enter parliament. The reason given, that the party needed immunity and gratis [railroad] tickets, did not hold water and only represented a rear guard action. For no party will get votes for that reason. What is needed instead is sober work within the parliament . . .

Now you are of the opinion that the Reich party has abandoned socialism and is no longer in a position to win over the artisans [Handwerker]. According to my experience, one achieves this only when the party is strong enough to protect them and to work in their social and political interest. But that in turn is only possible when [the party] enters the Reichstag in greater numbers. Then it would be compelled . . . to take stands on the issues of the day soberly and objectively in the various committees and plenary sessions. That is the way we do it. Nor does one need to atrophy, as our example demonstrates. We achieve the necessary balance through large rallies, for example the ‚völkischen Tag', and are simultaneously party and movement [63]."

Jung's assessment of Hitler's party was, of course, wrong. It represented the same kind of whistling in the dark that the DNSAP leaders had indulged in for years. Certainly Hitler owed them a great deal. After all, the „legal" NSDAP of 1930 was a far cry from the putsch-oriented one of 1923, and the Sudeten Nazis had a lot to do with the difference. But the Führer was not about to acknowledge that debt, nor were any similarities between his political tactics and those pursued by the DNSAP for years anything more than temporary expedients. Contrary to Jung's assertion, the NSDAP was not in the process of becoming like the DNSAP.

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[61] See e. g., Tag, no. 98, May 21, 1924.

[62] See Schlabrendorf, Fabian von: The Secret War Against Hitler. New York 1965, p. 183.

[63] Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Schumacher Sammlung 313, Letter of July 17, 1930.

Had Jung and his colleagues been less provincial and more perceptive they might have noted this fact. They might have perceived that to any outside observer the Sudeten Nazis had objectively lost their „seniority" in the movement as early as 1923 when Hitler first rose dramatically to prominence in Germany and made „junior partners" of them. Nowhere is this reversal of roles in the changing relationship between the Sudeten Nazis and Hitler so dramatically apparent than within the framework of the so-called „Interstate Chancellory". This liaison organisation was the brainchild of Walter Riehl, leader of the Austrian branch of the movement. At a meeting of 150 delegates from both the Austrian and Sudeten branches in Vienna in early December, 1919, Riehl noted that although it might be a bit premature, since there was not yet a strong brother movement in the Reich, there were sufficient „intellectual roots" of National Socialism to justify some kind of organization to link the various groups. The other delegates agreed and assigned the Austrians the task of setting it up. Part of its activities was to be an annual conference to be held, usually in August, where National Socialists from Austria, Czechoslovakia, Germany and Poland would get together to coordinate their activities and render mutual support [64]. There were three of these meetings — at Salzburg in 1920, Linz in 1921, Vienna in 1922. Each of them showed dramatically an evolutionary process in which the power and prestige of the Munich branch increased and that of the original Nazis diminished accordingly.

The first conference met on August 8, 1920 in Salzburg [65]. Two hundred and fifty representatives showed up along with one hundred guests. All the groups were there, including Brunner's *Deutschsozialisten*, the Upper Silesians, represented by Alexander Schilling, the Sudetens by Jung, Knirsch and others. The Munich group sent Drexler and Hitler. The hosts, of course, were the Austrians. The allocation of votes reflects which group was predominant: it was the Bohemians [66]. They had four votes, the Austrians three, Brunner's people two, the others one each. That meant that theoretically the Sudetens and Austrians together had seven times the weight that the Munich delegation had. That superiority showed up in the decisions. The conference declared that all the groups together would now be called the „National Socialist Party of the German People", something that Hitler would always reject, insisting on the exclusivity of his branch of the movement and of his personal leadership. At this point, however, he was in no position to insist on anything. He did not yet completely dominate even the Munich branch of the movement, much less all the others; moreover, he was not even known yet to the others. The records of this conference show only that a comrade „Hüttler" made a brief speech indicating that he would rather „be hung in a Bolshevik Germany than be contented in a French Germany", and then went on to describe the growth of the party in Munich. He also forcefully pointed out that it was absolutely necessary to translate ideological awareness into an active mass movement. It is doubtful if this harbinger of the future sank in, for the conference proceeded with the usual

[64] Tag, no. 210, December 14, 1919.
[65] For the proceedings, see Tag, no. 166, August 13, 1920 and no. 167, August 4, 1920.
[66] The votes were allocated already several months before the conference. Tag, no. 136, June 22, 1920.

dull speeches and stale ideological debates. Hitler had, however, apparently impressed one of those present. After he finished speaking, Jung purportedly said in an aside to his secretary: „This Hitler will someday be our greatest [67]."

The next conference met in Linz on August 13 and 14, 1921 [68]. Again the votes were weighted as the previous year, the Bohemians with four, the Austrians with three, the Munich branch now had two votes, one more than the previous year. But that scarcely mattered, for no one was there officially from Munich. Just one month before, Hitler had staged his palace revolution and seized dictatorial control of the Munich party. As a result, the Munich Nazis boycotted the conference which still spoke for a National Socialism which Hitler rejected. As the conference unfolded, it became apparent that the „senior" Nazis were living in a fool's paradise. It was the same old dreary business. Greetings and reports; more resolutions trying to define the party's ideological position, sessions on currency reform, a lecture by Riehl on profit sharing as a road to socialism, and finally a lengthy debate over whether the party should follow the economic ideas of Gottfried Feder or Sylvio Gesell. The conference concluded with a steamboat ride and a hike. The only steps taken which showed any realization at all of the coming power relationships was the decision to move the „Interstate Chancellory" to Germany. But even then, where it was to be located was to be decided democratically.

On June 15, 1922, the third and final gathering of the „Interstate Chancellory" took place in Vienna [69]. But reflecting the reversal in roles from four years before, this was not so much a conference as a „Führerbesprechung". From Munich in great numbers came the Hitler people, including Esser, Drexler, Amann, Rosenberg, Singer, and, of course, the Führer himself. This time there was no thought of weighted votes or lengthy ideological debates. Rather, the dominant feature of the meeting was a display of the way the Munich people played politics: a rally in the Sophiensale complete with the new Ordnertruppe to keep order and several hundred Communist hecklers who nearly turned the rally into a Munich-style brawl. Significantly, when the noise abated, Riehl introduced Hitler as „unseren Reichsdeutschen Führer".

From this point on, there was no question as to who the junior partners were in National Socialism despite their chronological seniority: the Bohemian (and Austrian) Nazis. Stuck in the backwater of central Europe, they were forced more and more to recognize Hitler's waxing star in the Reich, and the notoriety which his brand of politics brought. Six months after the Vienna meeting, the Austrian National Socialist, Riehl, wrote: „Today an American friend sent me a copy of a large American newspaper, in which no less than one and a half columns are devoted to you and the Bavarian movement, which were scarcely known a year ago [70]." It was indicative of how far the Munich branch had come in a short time; a similar article on the Sudeten or Austrian Nazis was scarcely to be expected.

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[67] See Heiden: Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 33—35. — Maser: Frühgeschichte 244—246.

[68] For the proceedings, see Tag, no. 118, August 3, 1921 (on preparations for the conference) and no. 128, August 23, 1921. — Maser: Frühgeschichte 281—282.

[69] Again, see Tag, no. 93, June 20, 1922 for the proceedings. — Brandstötter: Riehl 185—187.

[70] Maser: Frühgeschichte 342.