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THE CREATION OF THE CONDITIONS FOR CONSOCIATIONAL DEMOCRACY AND ITS DEVELOPMENT IN INTERWAR CZECHOSLOVAKIA[1]

Social scientists accept that Austria after the Second World War fits the pattern of consociationalism, a form of democracy that ensures representation for all segments in deeply divided societies. Many also contend that the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic, after the fall of communism, and its successors, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, exhibit consociational features. Nevertheless, few consider the roots of consociationalism in these states, and those who have done so have presented only cursory explanations or erred in applying the theory. In reality, consociational arrangements began to develop in the Habsburg Monarchy, during the latter half of the 19th century. Consociational democracy also existed in Austria from 1918 until the middle of the 1920s and in Czechoslovakia from 1918 until the 1938 Munich Agreement. When viewing these historical cases, many scholars mistakenly see certain political traits as failures of democracy; in fact, they are means of ensuring inclusion and political compromise. After presenting a brief overview of the consociational model, this article will consider three cases of consociationalism in Central Europe: the progress of Imperial Austria toward democracy, the Czechoslovak First Republic as a consociational state, and Slovakia's democratic development within interwar Czechoslovakia.

The political scientist Arend Lijphart (born 1936) developed the consociational model in reaction to two long-standing but insufficiently examined themes in the comparative study of democracy: first, the claim that social homogeneity is a prerequisite for stable democracy; and second, the largely unquestioned equation of democracy with majority rule.[2] By examining political institutions and practices in

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[2] Although this is not the place for a comprehensive review, those who wish to explore this vast literature may begin with *Lijphart*, Arend: Democracy in Plural Societies. A Comparative Exploration. New Haven 1977. – See also *Lijphart:* The Puzzle of Indian Democracy. A Consociational Interpretation. In: American Political Science Review 90 (1996) no. 2, 258-268. – The latter also appears in *Lijphart* (ed.): Thinking about Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. London 2008, which provides a comprehensive overview of Lijphart's work. – Although not directly about consociationalism, *Lijphart:* Patterns of Democracy. New Haven 1999. 2nd edition classifies

his native Netherlands in the 1950s and 1960s, and by expanding this analysis to include the Austrian Second Republic, Belgium, and Switzerland, Lijphart argued that plural societies with segmental cleavages – those societies in which parties and private associations tend to be organized along linguistic, ethnic, religious, or ideological lines – can build stable democracies. He and other political scientists have applied the theory fruitfully to a number of such plural societies, including Colombia, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia between 1989 and 1992, India, Lebanon, Luxembourg, and Malaysia, while some scholars have identified consociational characteristics in nondemocratic states, such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, the Ottoman Empire, Paraguay, the Soviet Union, Uganda, and Yugoslavia.[3] Scholars have used the consociational model to assess a growing number of other political systems, including those of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Canada, Congo, the European Union, Fiji, Gambia, Indonesia, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Kashmir, Kenya, Kosovo, Liechtenstein, Macedonia, Montenegro, Netherlands Antilles, Nigeria, Northern Ireland, Republika Srpska, Rwanda, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela.[4] Recent studies even have begun to apply consociational theory to city-level politics in Aceh, Baghdad, Belfast, Brussels, Jerusalem, Johannesburg, Kirkuk, and Sara-

democratic political systems in terms of how majoritarian or consensual they are, thereby illustrating the great variety of possible democratic institutions. – Finally, surveys of current debates and developments in consociational research appear in *Köppl,* Stefan/*Kranenpohl,* Uwe (eds.): Konkordanzdemokratie. Ein Demokratietyp der Vergangenheit? Baden-Baden 2012. – See also *McEvoy,* Joanne/*O'Leary,* Brendan (eds.): Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. Philadelphia 2013.

[3] *Andeweg,* Rudy B.: Consociational Democracy. In: Annual Review of Political Science 3 (2000) 509-536, here 514. – *Lijphart:* The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2) discusses the first set of cases. – *Esman,* Milton J.: Power Sharing and the Constructivist Fallacy. In: *Crepaz,* Markus M. L./*Koelble,* Thomas A./*Wilsford,* David: Democracy and Institutions: The Life Work of Arend Lijphart. Michigan 2000, 91-112. – *Lijphart:* The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2) for the second set.

[4] *Andeweg:* Consociational Democracy 514-515 (cf. fn. 3). – *Belloni,* Roberto: State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia. New York 2007. – *Bieber,* Florian: The Balkans: The Promotion of Power Sharing by Outsiders. In: *McEvoy/O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 312-326 (cf. fn. 2). – *Bogaards,* Matthijs/*Crepaz,* Markus M.L.: Consociational Interpretations of the European Union. In: European Union Politics 3 (2002) no. 3, 357-381. – *Cairns,* Ed: Northern Ireland: Power Sharing, Contact, Identity, and Leadership. In: *McEvoy/O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 278-294 (cf. fn. 2). – *Irwin,* Colin: Public Opinion and Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places. In: *Ibid.* 295-311 (cf. fn. 2). – *Lijphart:* Democracy in Plural Societies chaps. 4-6 (cf. fn. 2). – *Lijphart:* The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 258 (cf. fn. 2). – *McCulloch,* Allison: Power-Sharing and Political Stability in Deeply Divided Societies. London, New York 2014. – *McCulloch,* Allison: The Track Record of Centripetalism in Deeply Divided Places. In: *McEvoy/O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 94-111 (cf. fn. 2). – *McEvoy,* Joanne: We Forbid! The Mutual Veto and Power-Sharing Democracy. In: *Ibid.* 253-277 (cf. fn, 2). – *McGarry,* John/*O'Leary,* Brendan: Iraq's Constitution of 2005: Liberal Consociationalism as Political Prescription. In: International Journal of Constitutional Law 5 (2007) no. 4, 670-698. – *Merdzanovic,* Adis: Democracy by Decree: Prospects and Limits of Imposed Consociational Democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Stuttgart 2015. – *Taylor,* Rupert (ed.): Consociational Theory: McGarry and O'Leary and the Northern Ireland Conflict. New York 2009.

jevo.[5] Most important, in the last decades, such deeply divided societies as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, and post-apartheid South Africa have adopted consociational democratic solutions.[6]

To curtail conflict, consociationalism ideally includes representatives of every major group in the decision-making process, while it excludes from consideration particularly divisive issues, such as language, education, and religion. It accomplishes these tasks through four vehicles. First is the grand coalition. Although the term conventionally refers to cabinets involving all of the major political parties, the defining feature of a Lijphartian grand coalition is that it includes members of all of the major groups or segmental cleavages in a given country. Lijphartian grand coalitions, therefore, may be grand coalitions in the conventional sense, but they also may involve alternative arrangements, such as mandatory representation in cabinets for major linguistic or other groups, a system of advisory councils outside the cabinet, or the allocation of the presidency or premiership to members of specified groups. In this article, a partial grand coalition indicates governments that nearly conform to the Lijphartian grand coalition model but exclude one of the major groups and perhaps some less important groups. Second is segmental autonomy, which might include territorial federalism, autonomous but publicly funded schools for each group, and separate personal laws concerning marriage, divorce, child custody, child adoption, and inheritance. Third is proportionality, which refers to the fair distribution of seats among groups through the use of electoral formulas, districts with exclusive nominating rights for minority parties, reserved seats for minority representatives, overrepresented minorities, or artificial parity in awarding mandates. It often extends to the proportional allocation of civil service jobs and public funds. Finally, the minority or mutual veto empowers members of minority groups to block legislation that threatens their interests. This often is an informal practice, and in well-functioning consociational democracies, its actual use is rare.

Lijphart listed nine conditions that favor consociationalism, none of which are either necessary or sufficient for its success. In other words, it is possible for consociationalism to fail, even if all nine conditions are met, and it is possible, although unlikely, for it to succeed without meeting any of them. The first two are the most important: 1) the absence of a unified majority based on ethnicity, religion, or ideology; and 2) the lack of large socioeconomic disparities among the groups. There are seven remaining favorable conditions: 3) the presence of a relatively small number of

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[5]   *Anderson,* Liam: Power Sharing in Kirkuk: The Need for Compromise. In: *McEvoy/ O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 365-385 (cf. fn. 2). – *Bollens,* Scott A.: Governing Polarized Cities. In: *Ibid.* 327-363 (cf. fn. 2). – *Stepan,* Alfred: A Revised Theory of Federacy and a Case Study of Civil War Termination in Aceh, Indonesia. In: *Ibid.* 231-252 (cf. fn. 2).

[6]   *Andeweg*: Consociational Democracy 516-517 (cf. fn. 3). – *Bieber:* The Balkans (cf. fn. 4). – *Cairns:* Northern Ireland (cf. fn. 4). – *Guelke,* Adrian: Politics in Deeply Divided Societies. Malden 2012. – *Irwin:* Public Opinion (cf. fn. 4). – *Issacharoff*, Samuel: Courts, Constitutions, and the Limits of Majoritarianism. In: *McEvoy/ O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 214-227 (cf. fn. 2). – *McEvoy:* We Forbid! (cf. fn. 4). – *McCulloch:* Power-Sharing and Political Stability (cf. fn. 4). – *Merdzanovic:* Democracy by Decree (cf. fn. 4).

groups; 4) the existence of groups that are "roughly the same size"; 5) a population that is relatively small; 6) the presence of "external dangers" that "promote internal unity" to stave off occupation or partition; 7) a series of "overarching loyalties", such as a unifying national identiy or a monarch, that can appeal to all segments of the society; 8) a concentration of groups in geographic areas that facilitates territorial federalism; and 9) "traditions of compromise and accommodation" that historically bind together the various segments in order to govern the state.[7]

The 1867 Ausgleich made the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy two distinct constitutional entities, Imperial Austria and the Kingdom of Hungary, which shared a common monarch and a number of joint institutions. There were common ministries of foreign affairs, the military, and joint finances. Otherwise, each half of the Dual Monarchy had its own cabinet, with individual interior, finance, and other ministries, and each had its own legislature – the Imperial Austrian Reichsrat and the Hungarian Országgyűlés. In the Austrian half of the monarchy, significant restrictions on democracy resulted from several factors: dualism itself, since the Reichsrat lacked jurisdiction over Austro-Hungarian joint interests; the executive, who was unelected and formally unaccountable; the upper house, which also was unelected; and the 17 provincial governments, which handled specific policy areas in a federalist arrangement and had diets that never fully adopted universal manhood suffrage. Although Austria did not become a democracy at that time, a series of electoral reforms gradually moved its representative institutions in that direction. As of 1907, universal manhood suffrage applied to the lower house of parliament, and voter turnout remained high in elections, which involved competition among numerous, ideologically diverse mass parties.[8]

With its population of Czechs, Germans, Italians, Poles, Rusyns, Slovenes, and Ukrainians, along with smaller ethnic groups, including Croats, Jews, Roma, Romanians, and Serbs, Austria was very much a plural society. Political parties, public organizations, and private associations were divided along segmental lines. Several favorable conditions for consociationalism were present, including the absence of an ethnic or ideological majority. Most of the population was Catholic; however, ethnic and ideological factors prevented Catholicism from acting as a unifying political force. Imperial Austria also had a rough balance in group size, socioeconomic interests that cut across ethnic lines, and a common tradition of Habsburg rule. Certain other factors were ambiguous or negative: external threats were both unifying, in that they could encourage loyalty to the dynasty, and divisive, such as irridentism that inflamed nationalist tensions; a history of both conflict and cooperation among the political elite; a large number of groups; some geographically dispersed groups;

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[7] *Lijphart:* Democracy in Plural Societies ch. 3 (cf. fn. 2). – *Lijphart:* The Puzzle of Indian Democracy 262-263 (cf. fn. 2).

[8] In the decade before the First World War, the contrast between Imperial Austria, which was beginning to display features of consociationalism, and the Kingdom of Hungary is worth emphasizing. In Hungary, ongoing restrictions on voting rights and the absence of federalism helped concentrate power in the hands of a Hungarian-speaking elite that increasingly pursued a policy of Magyarization toward the non-Hungarian minorities.

and a relatively large population, which in 1910 was approximately 28,572,000. In short, although conditions were not ideal, Imperial Austria had good potential for successfully adopting consociational politics.

The Imperial Austrian system of government gradually approximated all four characteristics of consociationalism. The distribution of parliamentary mandates by ethnic group was increasingly proportional, and after the earliest electoral reforms, no group had a majority. Civil service employment also was increasingly proportional. Language controversies notwithstanding, bureaucrats communicated with the local populations in their own languages. Precedents existed for partitioning universities along ethnic lines, and the language of primary and secondary education increasingly corresponded to local language use. These developments, along with the ongoing segregation of organizations, furthered segmental autonomy.

The structure of the executive and parliamentary procedure provided a de facto minority veto by allowing small groups to obstruct legislative action. One colorful illustration of this is the famous Badeni crisis, in which violent obstruction by German elected representatives led to the repeal of the controversial language ordinances for Bohemia and the downfall of the government of Count Kasimir Felix Badeni (1846-1909). While the crisis was hardly a model of democratic parliamentary politics and did much to harm the parliament's long-term legitimacy, it demonstrated how a legislative minority could block policies that harmed the interests of the group they represented. Such action also could prevent the imperial government from bypassing the legislature in order to enact certain policies. Furthermore, although Imperial cabinets never embraced the ideal of the grand coalition, at least in the strict sense, they tended to include representatives from the three largest ethnic groups – Czechs, Germans, and Poles – and a diverse cross section of parties. The main exception was the Social Democrats, but grand coalitions frequently exclude important parties.[9] The threat of obstruction required that governments maintain the tacit backing of a supermajority, thereby significantly broadening their effective base within the legislature.[10]

Even stronger parallels to consociationalism occurred in the regional interethnic compromises in the crown lands of Moravia, Bukovina, and Galicia as well as the city of České Budějovice, although the latter two never took effect because of the First World War. These were part of a general trend, since there was talk of similar

[9] For example, Austrian grand coalitions, for many years after the Second World War, included the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP), but not the national-liberal Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ). Similarly, although Switzerland's so-called magic formula has required inclusion of the four largest parties in the cabinet, the specific parties it included have varied over time.

[10] *Höbelt,* Lothar: "Well-tempered Discontent": Austrian Domestic Politics. In: *Cornwall,* Mark (ed.): The Last Years of Austria-Hungary. A Multi-National Experiment in Early Twentieth-Century Europe. Exeter 2002 (revised and expanded edition) 44-74. – *Höbelt,* Lothar: Parteien und Fraktionen im Cisleithanischen Reichsrat. In: *Rumpler,* Helmut/ *Urbanitsch,* Peter (eds.): Die Habsburgermonarchie 1848-1918. Band 7: Verfassung und Parlamentarismus, Teil 1: Verfassungsrecht, Verfassungswirklichkeit, zentrale Repräsentativkörperschaften. Wien 2000, 895-1006.

compromises in the Crown Land of Bohemia and the city of Olomouc as well as in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the administration of which Austria and Hungary shared. These compromises typically involved arrangements to secure the representation of all major ethnic groups through *Wahlkataster* (registers of voters), each with its own mandates in the provincial diets or town councils. Minorities typically were over-represented, enabling them to block legislation that threatened their interests. For example, the 1905 Moravian Compromise designated 73 seats in the diet for Czechs, 40 for Germans, 30 for provincial aristocrats and great landowners, 6 for the chambers of commerce members, and 2 for high ecclesiastical figures. Czechs, who were in the majority, had less than half the seats, while Germans, constituting about 28 per cent of the population, were overrepresented in the diet, since Germans predominated among the provincial aristocrats, great landowners, chambers of commerce members, and high ecclesiastics. The reorganized provincial executive committee included 4 Czechs, 2 Germans, and 2 great landowners. Furthermore, there were separate school boards, at the provincial and local levels, and school children received an education in their own languages; however, Moravia, unlike Bohemia, did not have separate Czech and German universities.

These reforms, as well as those in the other provinces, may have been consociational, but they did not create completely democratic systems. Electoral reforms between 1867 and 1907 introduced universal manhood suffrage on the parliamentary level. By contrast, while the provincial diets gradually expanded suffrage, they retained the older system of curial voting, whereby major socio-economic groups each had a specified number of seats, a system that heavily overrepresented capitalists and great landowners. While many provinces eventually added an additional curia, elected through universal manhood suffrage, they still retained the traditional curiae. Furthermore, the Kaiser continued to appoint both *Landeshauptmänner* (provincial governors) and imperial ministers.

Historians' accounts of the Austrian Parliament have been largely negative. Nevertheless, an explosion of parliamentary, provincial, and party histories in recent decades has led to a more nuanced view of the Reichsrat and a greater respect for its accomplishments. Criticisms of the Austrian parliament often reflect an implicit Westminsterian or majoritarian bias. Meanwhile, unfamiliarity with the political science literature on consociationalism has led historians to misinterpret consociational elements in both the overall political system and in the various regional compromises.

Soloman Wank (1930-2014) presented several commonly cited criticisms of the Moravian and other compromises: they were the result of peculiar local conditions and were inapplicable elsewhere; they were not actual compromises but rather a separation of groups; and they were undemocratic because they consolidated the privileged position of the aristocracy and the ethnic minorities, thereby blocking hopes for fundamental change.[11] The first of these objections is problematic, given the broad range of conditions under which consociationalism is said to be feasible and

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[11] *Wank,* Soloman: Some Reflections on the Habsburg Empire and Its Legacy in the Nationalities Question. In: Austrian History Yearbook 28 (1997) 131-146, here 144-145.

given Lijphart's insistence that none of his nine favorable conditions are strictly necessary. One cannot rule out the possibility that such compromises might have worked in Bohemia or elsewhere, and their spread suggests that they had a broad appeal. The second objection is actually a basic premise of consociationalism because the apparent loss of fraternity inherent in the compromises is the price for stable legislative politics. Even the critics concede that they did just that.[12] Finally, the third objection is actually more concerned with oligarchy than with consociationalism. It is reasonable to suppose that the gradual expansion of the suffrage, on all levels of Austrian politics, might have continued, had war not intervened. Further, successful provincial oligarchic compromises fostered a tradition of elite accommodation, a favorable condition that could have facilitated future, more democratic consociational developments. Finally, the overrepresentation of Germans and other minorities is a standard consociational mechanism for defending minority interests.

An additional set of criticisms arises from a growing historical literature on national flexibility in the Habsburg Monarchy, a literature that challenges the "realism of the nation" by examining such phenomena as national indifference, multilingualism, dynastic loyalism, and individuals changing national identities or holding multiple ones simultaneously.[13] Drawing on and reacting to that literature, critics of the ethnicizing of politics are particularly concerned with the negative consequences of establishing national *Wahlkataster* and segregated schools.[14] According to this line of criticism, not only did these policies falsely presume a population divided along clearly defined national lines, but they also involved a significant intrusion of gov-

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[12] *Glassl,* Horst: Der Mährische Ausgleich. München 1967, 244. – *Kelly,* T. Mills: Last Best Chance or Last Gasp? The Compromise of 1905 and Czech Politics in Moravia. In: Austrian History Yearbook 34 (2003) 279-301, here 300-301. – *Stourzh,* Gerald: The Ethnicizing of Politics and "National Indifference" in Late Imperial Austria. In: *Stourzh* (ed.): Der Umfang der österreichischen Geschichte. Ausgewählte Studien 1990-2010. Wien 2011, 283-322, here 310.

[13] On "the realism of the nation", see *Brubaker,* Rogers: Nationalism Reframed. Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge 1996. – A key monograph in this literature is *King,* Jeremy: Budweisers into Czechs and Germans. A Local History of Bohemian Politics 1848-1948. Princeton 2002. – There are other major works to consider, such as the Austrian History Yearbook 43 (2012). – *Brix,* Emil: Die Umgangssprachen in Altösterreich zwischen Agitation und Assimilation: Die Sprachenstatistik in den zisleithanischen Volkszählungen, 1880 bis 1910. Wien 1982 (Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Österreichs 72). – *Cohen,* Gary B.: The Politics of Ethnic Survival. West Lafayette 2006. 2nd revised edition. – *Cole,* Laurence/*Unowsky,* Daniel L. (eds.): The Limits of Loyalty: Imperial Symbolism, Popular Allegiances, and State Patriotism in the Late Habsburg Monarchy. Oxford, New York 2007. – *Judson,* Pieter M.: Guardians of the Nation: Activists on the Language Frontiers of Imperial Austria. Cambridge 2006. – *Judson/Rozenblit,* Marsha L. (eds.): Constructing Nationalities in East Central Europe. New York 2005. – *Zahra,* Tara: Kidnapped Souls. National Indifference and the Battle for Children in the Bohemian Lands 1900-1948. Ithaca 2008.

[14] *Burger,* Hannelore: Der Verlust der Mehrsprachigkeit. Aspekte des Mährischen Ausgleichs. In: Bohemia 34 (1993) no. 1, 77-89. – *Stourzh,* Gerald: Ethnic Attribution in Late Imperial Austria. Good Intentions, Evil Consequences. In: *Robertson,* Ritchie/*Timms,* Edward: The Habsburg Legacy. National Identity in Historical Perspective. Edinburgh 1994, 67-83. – *Zahra:* Kidnapped Souls (cf. fn. 13).

ernment into private life, in order to determine the correct identity of individuals, thereby setting a dangerous precedent for ethnic group membership trumping citizenship.

In arguing that consociationalism "increases the plural nature of an already plural society", consociational theory acknowledges the somewhat artificial character of group distinctions that, nevertheless, promote democratic stability.[15] Critics raise important concerns about the possible consequences, for ordinary citizens, of such arrangements, and this, in turn, suggests possible new areas for research, specifically into the question of whether nationalist abuses of consociational arrangements were unique to Imperial Austria.[16] Even so, scholars must not overlook Austria's important contributions to practical politics. Nations may not be real, but nationalists are a reality, and any means of guiding their political activities in a less conflictual and a more democratic direction is worth taking seriously. Unknowingly, Austrian politicians experimented with policies that have become standard tools for promoting democratic stability in divided societies decades before political scientists even recognized or named them.[17]

Building on Imperial Austria's proto-consociational legacy, interwar Czechoslovakia evolved as a consociational democracy. The Czechoslovak First Republic had 18 governments, in its two decades of existence, including 3 bureaucratic cabinets. Mixed cabinets of politicians and experts were the rule, all governments were coalitions, and no government lived out its term. German parties, which represented 23 per cent of the population, refused to participate in the parliament until 1920; however, once they had entered the cabinet in 1926, they remained a part of all governing coalitions until the end of the republic. While these and other features of the Czechoslovak political scene, during the 1920s and 1930s, have been baffling for many, even for a few political actors at the time, they do not provide evidence that the republic's democracy was inherently faulty. Instead, they are manifestations of consociationalism.

Czechoslovakia met all nine of Lijphart's favorable conditions. First, there was no unified majority because the multinational population included Czechs (50 per cent) and Slovaks (16 per cent), Germans (23 per cent), and small percentages of

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[15] *Lijphart:* Democracy in Plural Societies 42 (cf. fn. 2).

[16] The consociational literature already addressed many concerns these critics raised. Specifically, a general consensus has developed among political scientists in favor of "liberal consociationalism", which allows individuals to self-select their group membership, as opposed to "corporate consociationalism", in which ascribed traits define fixed groups. See *McEvoy / O'Leary:* Power Sharing in Deeply Divided Places 27-28 (cf. fn. 2). – *McGarry / O'Leary:* Iraq's Constitution (cf. fn.4). Both defenders and critics of Imperial Austria's regional compromises can benefit from the broader perspective that the consociational literature provides.

[17] Although Imperial Austria predates the consociational model, a number of its intellectuals, in particular the Austro-Marxists, foreshadowed important consociational themes through their theory of "personal autonomy". See *Lijphart,* Arend: Introduction: Developments in Power Sharing Theory. In: *Lijphart:* Thinking about Democracy 3-22, here 4 (cf. fn. 2).

Hungarians, Rusyns, Jews, Poles, and Roma.[18] There was no predominant ideological tendency, although socialism, agrarianism, and Christian socialism attracted the greatest amount of support. In terms of religion, Catholics formed 74 per cent of the population; however, even though most were Czechs and Slovaks, they did not act with one voice, and many Catholics, especially Czechs, were indifferent about religion.[19] Second, despite the fact that the Bohemian Lands were far more industrialized and wealthier than the eastern provinces, the living standards in the east, when viewed as a whole, improved in the 1920s and 1930s. Furthermore, the segments in the country had no great disparities in socioeconomic status, since there were similarities in the living standards of industrial workers and agriculturalists, both of whom formed the majority of the population. Notwithstanding that Germans were overrepresented as owners of industry and finance, there were plenty of Czech industrialists, financiers, and large landowners, and some even were Slovak, Hungarian, or Jewish.[20] Third, there were not many segments, when one considers that there were three main ethnic groups, two main religions, and three predominant ideologies. Throughout the 1920s and well into the 1930s, there were fewer than ten major political parties, representing five different political currents: socialism, agrarianism, and Christian socialism, the strongest, as well as communism and the conservative liberalism of the wealthy. The success of the anti-system Sudeten German party in the 1935 elections enabled German nationalism to stake a claim as a major political current, with only one seat less than the Republican (Agrarian) Party, but it had no allies with whom to form a governing coalition. Fourth, the most important segments of the society were reasonably balanced. Half the country was Czech, while the other half was a mixture of ethnic groups, including Slovaks; nonetheless, the common ethnic origins of the Czechs and Slovaks did not guarantee unity, despite the ideology of Czechoslovakism. In terms of religion, no group – Catholics, Protestants, those who were not religious, and those who were religiously indifferent – had an advantage in numbers. Even though the 1920 elections gave the Social Democrats a significant plurality of seats in the National Assembly, after the 1925 election, the party with a plurality generally had an advantage of only a few seats. Fifth, the country's population was small, in comparison to some of its neighbours, yet it was larger than Europe's other consociational states. Sixth, the republic had its

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[18] There is a large body of literature, which is too lengthy to present here, that considers the ethnic groups of Czechoslovakia. Examinations of the relationships among Czechs, Germans, and Jews in Prague, for example, has a long history that began shortly after the Second World War, with such works as *Eisner*, Paul: Franz Kafka and Prague. New York 1950. – It continues with the excellent contribution by *Koeltzsch*, Ines: Geteilte Kulturen. Eine Geschichte der tschechisch-jüdisch-deutschen Beziehungen in Prag (1918-1938). München 2012 (Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 124).

[19] Statistická ročenka Republiky československé, 1935 [Statistical Yearbook of the Czechoslovak Republic, 1935]. Praha 1935, Table II-7, 7 (ethnicity), and Table II-10, 8 (religion).

[20] On German ownership of businesses, see *Boyer*, Christoph: "Staatspolitisch unzuverlässig"? Zur Loyalität der deutschen Wirtschaft in der Ersten Tschechoslowakischen Republik. In: *Schulze Wessel*, Martin (ed.): Loyalitäten in der Tschechoslowakischen Republik 1918-1938: Politische, nationale und kulturelle Zugehörigkeiten. München 2004 (Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 101) 113-140, here 114.

share of external threats. Of the five states that bordered Czechoslovakia, only Romania never claimed any of its territory. Seventh, Czechoslovakia had over-arching loyalties, since economic, religious, and ideological divisions cut across ethnic lines. The president until 1935, Tomáš G. Masaryk (1850-1937), was, in many respects, a surrogate monarch who gained the respect of all ethnic groups. Antonín Švehla (1870-1933), the Republican leader, was another adroit politician who served to unite divergent interests. Occasionally, ethnic origin and shared religion bound together Czechs and Slovaks. Civic nationalism, at times, prompted ethnic groups to support coalition governments, certain policies, and economic prosperity. Even sport, such as the renowned soccer World Cup team of 1934, cut across ethnic lines.[21] Eighth, despite some mixed areas, the ethnic, ideological, economic, and to some extent, religious segments were concentrated geographically. Ninth, elite co-operation was common. In politics, as in economics, compromise and accommoda-tion were multifaceted. During the First Republic, various political parties entered governing coalitions and cooperated in the legislature, while leading politicians, of many colors, met informally, and those who cooperated with the president gathered in a grouping known as the Hrad. These were extensions of the sort of cooperation that existed among the parties, despite their disputes in the press, before the First World War and even during the war, when the parties formed groupings to establish common responses to policies and to present various demands. Finally, many polit-ical leaders also enjoyed long-term personal friendships that predated the creation of the republic.

Czechoslovakia exhibited all four components of consociationalism, the first of which is the grand coalition. Throughout the interwar years, the most common coalition type, accounting for 13 out of 15 political cabinets, was some form of Lijphartian grand coalition, that is, a broad coalition that provided wide ethnic, ideo-logical, and denominational diversity.[22] The first 6 cabinets of this type, beginning in 1921, were partial Lijphartian grand coalitions because, even though Czechs and Slovaks in the major parties always held ministerial posts, the governments did not contain representatives from the important German segment. Then, from 1926 to 1929, the cabinets included the so-called activist German parties, and from 1927 to 1929, they included the nationalist and autonomist Hlinka Slovak People's Party (HSĽS), but they did not involve the socialists.[23] The following seven cabinets, between 1929 and 1938, were full Lijphartian grand coalitions, with Czechs and Slovaks in the statewide parties (despite the departure of the HSĽS from the gov-ernment in 1929) as well as Germans. The total length of time for both types of

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[21] The 1934 FIFA World Cup team, which lost in the finals to Italy, included 18 Czechs, 2 Slovaks, 1 Hungarian, and 1 German, who was the noted player Ehrenfried Patzel (1904-2004).

[22] The two other cabinets, in 1919-1920, were part of the Red-Green Coalition of socialists and Republicans. The second, incidentally, was a minority coalition that depended on the cooperation of parties to the right in the legislature.

[23] The Hlinka Slovak People's Party received several invitations to join governments in the 1930s but never did so. The party, once simply known as the Slovak People's Party, even-tually took on the name of its founder, Andrej Hlinka (1864-1938).

Lijphartian coalition cabinets was impressive: they covered 15 years of the republic's existence of 20 years, roughly half for the partial and half for the full Lijphartian grand coalitions. It is apparent that the politicians felt comfortable working with the consociational grand coalition model and strove to strengthen it, even in the worst situation. For example, after the German activist parties had lost their constituencies to the fascist Sudeten German Party, in the second half of the 1930s, the coalitions still always included one or two of the German activist parties. Furthermore, over time, the governments not only were regularly full Lijphartian grand coalitions but also were more commonly oversized, that is, they included at least one more party than they needed to form a majority in the legislature.

A Lijphartian grand coalition extends beyond governing coalitions to include other official and unofficial links among the segments, as in the case of interwar Czechoslovakia. In the 1920s, politicians cooperated through the extraparliamentary and extraconstitutional Pětka (Committee of Five, 1920-1925) and its successors, the Šestka (Committee of Six, 1925-1926), and the Osmička (Committee of Eight, 1926-1929). These committees drew together the leaders of the governing parties, and they had parallel institutions in the leadership and committees of the National Assembly that, along with strict party discipline, made certain there was legislative support for government measures. Even after socialist demands brought about the end of these informal committees, the party leaders found it necessary to meet, in a similar fashion, in the Political Committees (1929-1938) that were part of each cabinet.

Czechoslovakia was not federal, and no area was formally autonomous, but there were mechanisms to recognize regional diversity, thereby assuring a measure of segmental autonomy, consociationalism's second component. Legislation provided for the use of minority languages in the bureaucracy and schools. Electoral districts guaranteed that ethnic groups had representation in the legislature. Quite significant was that, beginning in 1918, the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia, which dealt with Slovak affairs, the state Land Office, which carried out the land reform, and the Ministry of Schools had branches that operated in Bratislava. Ruthenia had an appointed governor and vice governor, and like Slovakia, it had branch ministries in Uzhhorod. Then, as of July 1927, Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia had uniform administrations that consisted of government-appointed provincial presidents as well as assemblies, with Prague appointing one-third of the representatives and the inhabitants electing the remaining two-thirds. Some of the branch ministries remained in Bratislava and Uzhhorod. Finally, in 1937, the government devised plans for making Ruthenia autonomous, but it only took the initial steps toward that end.[24]

Czechoslovakia had formal and informal means of ensuring proportionality. Voting districts gave ethnic groups a proportional share of representatives in the legislature – Czechs with about 50 per cent of the seats, Germans with about 25 per

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[24] Národní archiv v Praze [National Archive in Prague, NA], Předsednictvo ministerské rady [Presidium of the Ministerial Council, PMR], microfilm 8195, inventory number 2960, carton 4131, Protokol ze schůzí ministerské rady [Protocol of the Meeting of the Ministerial Council], meeting 41, 19 March 1937.

cent, Slovaks with about 17 per cent, and the remaining 8 per cent for the other minorities. The parties allotted the leadership positions in the National Assembly, according to the election results and in a way that further satisfied ethnic, ideological, and socioeconomic interests. Proportional representation of competing ideological groups was apparent in the parties represented in the legislature, all of the coalition governments, and in the dominance the major parties had over certain ministries and their staffs. Even though no formal procedures existed to guarantee positions for the minorities, Czechs and Slovaks did not exclusively control the bureaucracy. Before the peak of the Sudeten German crisis, the cabinet of Prime Minister Milan Hodža (1878-1944) agreed to employ more minorities and to provide minority firms with more government contracts, especially in minority districts.[25] The officer corps and ministries of health, social welfare, justice, and railways all contained minorities. Schools were proportional, a result of the language law, and schools in Slovakia generally taught in Slovak, even though the students would have found Czech to be intelligible. At times, respect for minority concerns came in other forms, such as the state's 1925 recognition of two additional religious holidays, 5 June, for commemorating Sts. Cyril (827 or 828-869) and Methodius (815 to 820-885), who appealed primarily to Catholics, and 6 June, to celebrate the religious reformer Jan Hus (c. 1372-1415), who had inspired the Hussite and Czech Brethren Churches.[26] In 1922, in Znojmo, Czechs and Germans forged an agreement for representation on the city council that reduced interethnic tensions, an echo of the regional interethnic compromises that had emerged during the Habsburg Monarchy.[27] Even many civic groups, including certain sport clubs, reserved leadership places for minorities. Of course, instituting more proportionality guarantees was one way that the republic could have strengthened its consociational character.

Finally, while the country had no formal mutual or minority veto, such an arrangement functioned within the framework of elite cooperation, including the extraparliamentary and extraconstitutional committees. To overcome roadblocks, resulting from tacit mutual vetoes, logrolling allowed political parties to back each other's proposals. The mutual veto was apparent in March 1921, with the resignation of Karel Engliš (1880-1961), as finance minister, owing to the objections of Alois Rašín (1867-1923), the influential National Democrat, about Engliš's handling of the economy.[28] An example of logrolling was the June 1926 approval of higher agricul-

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[25] NA, PMR, microfilm 8195, inventory number 2960, carton 4131, Protokol ze schůzí ministerské rady [Protocol of the Meeting of the Ministerial Council], meeting 38, 18 February 1937, item 7, 18-19, "Otázky menšinové" [Minority Questions].

[26] On national days in interwar Czechoslovakia, see the article of Andrea Talabér in this issue of Bohemia. – For the immediate political repercussions of the politicians' actions on 6 June 1925, see *Miller,* Daniel E.: Forging Political Compromise. Antonín Švehla and the Czechoslovak Republican Party 1918-1933. Pittsburgh 1999 (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies) 140.

[27] Johannes Florian Kontny's research on this topic resulted in his study "Securing Political Rule in the Periphery? The Transformation of Municipalism in Eupen and Znojmo/Znaim After the First World War (1918-1922)", which appears in this issue of Bohemia.

[28] *Šetřilová,* Jana: Alois Rašín: Dramatický život českého politika [Alois Rašín: The Dramatic Life of a Czech Politician]. Praha 1997, 103-104. – *Vencovský,* František: Karel Engliš. Brno

tural tariffs, with the support of the clerical parties, in return for an increase in the state salary, or *congrua,* for the clergy, which the Republicans backed.[29]

The consociational model also explains Slovakia's position within the Czechoslovak First Republic. Contrary to the interpretations of most historians, a debilitating clash among the centralists, who supported a unitary state, the nationalists, who demanded autonomy, and the minorities, which the nation-state had estranged, was not characteristic of Slovak politics. In fact, Slovak centralists, nationalists, and minorities cooperated to set policy within Slovakia and to safeguard Slovak interests, within the larger context of the Czechoslovak state.

An atmosphere of cooperation existed among the Slovaks from 1918 onwards. Representatives of all the prewar Slovak parties signed the Martin Declaration of 31 October 1918, which endorsed Slovakia's incorporation into the Czechoslovak state. They then proceeded to form a single fraction in the Revolutionary National Assembly, while interparty cooperation was also the norm in the more than 300 local national councils, which had emerged in the wake of the Habsburg Monarchy's dissolution.[30] From 1920 onwards, an array of competing parties appeared to have replaced interparty cooperation, yet they all continued to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Czechoslovak state.[31]

The benefits the Slovaks accrued from their incorporation into Czechoslovakia bolstered the spirit of consensus. The introduction of universal suffrage enabled the Slovaks to occupy the vast majority of the elected local government posts in Slovakia, to secure all of the senior official appointments in Slovakia, such as sheriffs and high court judges, and to obtain approximately one-fifth of the seats in the new Czechoslovak National Assembly. In addition, the majority of schools in Slovakia saw their language of instruction changed from Hungarian to Slovak (rather than

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1993 (Universitas Masarykiana edice osobnosti) 17-18, 30-32. – *Klimek,* Antonín: Boj o Hrad [Struggle for the Castle]. Vol. 1: Hrad a Pětka. Vnitropolitický vývoj Československa 1918-1926 na půdorysu zápasu o prezidentské nástupnictví [The Castle and the Pětka: The Internal Political Development of Czechoslovakia, 1918-1926, Based on the Struggle for Presidential Succession]. Praha 1996, 157-158.

[29] *Polák,* Erik: K otázce rozpadu všenárodní koalice a nastolení vlády mezinárodní buržoazie v Československu v letech 1925-1926 [The Question of the Collapse of the All-National Coalition and the Establishment of the Multinational Bourgeois Government in Czechoslovakia 1925-1926]. In: Československý časopis historický 9 (1961) 17-41, especially 31-35.

[30] For interparty cooperation in the Slovak National Councils, see *Hronský,* Marián: Slovensko na rázcestí [Slovakia at the Crossroads]. Košice 1976, 20-43, 210-215. – See also *Medvecký,* K. A.: Slovenský prevrat [The Slovak Revolution]. 4 vols. Trnava 1930-1931, vol. 2, 17; vol. 3, 81-83; vol. 4, 71-83, 114-115, and 354.

[31] See *Mlynárik,* Jan: The Nationality Question in Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich Agreement. In: *Stone,* Norman/*Strouhal,* Eduard (eds.): Czechoslovakia. Crossroads and Crises. 1918-1988. Houndmills 1989, 92. – See also *Angyal,* Béla: A csehszlovákiai magyar pártok viszonya a prágai kormányzatokhoz és a szlovák autonomista törekvésekhez [The Relationship of the Hungarian Parties in Czechoslovakia to the Governments in Prague and to Slovak Autonomist Ambitions]. In: *Bárdi,* Nándor/*Simon,* Attila (eds.): Integrációs stratégiák a magyar kisebbségek történetében [Integration Strategies in the History of Hungarian Minorities]. Somorja 2006 (Disputationes Samarienses 9) 321-341, here 340.

Czech). With their augmented freedoms of speech and assembly, Slovaks experienced the emergence of new Slovak political and cultural institutions and the expansion of existing ones as well as an explosion of Slovak publications and participation in mass parties.[32]

The presence of prominent Slovaks, occasionally even nationalist Slovaks, as ministers in each of the governing coalitions throughout the interwar period, and the fact that a Slovak was prime minister from 1935 to 1938 reinforced broad and enduring support for Czechoslovakia's preservation. Moreover, the Slovaks' presence and influence in the bureaucracy increased, over the course of the republic's existence. By the 1930s onwards, the overwhelming majority of officials in Slovakia came from the local population, and the number of Slovaks working in government ministries in Prague expanded exponentially.[33]

The Slovaks wielded a de facto veto over government legislation, and Slovak pressure had a significant impact on Czechoslovak policy making: it influenced the land reform legislation in 1919; it forced the government to abandon its policy of colonization on the great estates; it impeded ambitions to separate the church and state; it obstructed the unification of the two separate law codes of the Bohemian Lands and Slovakia; it blocked plans to centralize the minting of coinage, in order to protect a mint in Slovakia; it made certain that Slovak, rather than Czech, was the language of instruction in Slovak schools; it checked the pro-Soviet tendencies that occasionally surfaced in Czechoslovak foreign policy; and it encouraged the government to adopt a protectionist trade policy that benefitted Slovak farmers but crippled the exports of Czech manufacturers.[34]

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[32] For specific details about the Slovak cultural renaissance, see *Kázmerová,* Ľubica: K vývinu štruktúry školstva na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1938 [The Evolution of the Structure of Education in Slovakia 1918-1938]. In: *Zemko,* Milan / *Bystrický,* Valerian (eds.): Slovensko v Československu (1918-1939) [Slovakia in Czechoslovakia (1918-1939)]. Bratislava 2004, 417-440. – *Letz,* Robert: Prínos Slovenskej ligy k vybudovaniu slovenského školstva (1920-1948) [The Contribution of the Slovak League to the Building of the Slovak Education System (1920-1948)]. In: Historický zborník 6 (1996) 48-59. – *Šrobár,* Vavro: Cultural Progress in Slovakia. In: *Seton-Watson,* R. W. (ed.): Slovakia Then and Now. A Political Survey. London 1931, 107-114, here 110-111. – *Mannová,* Elena: A Concise History of Slovakia. Translated by Martin C. Styan and David P. Daniel. Bratislava 2000 (Studia historica Slovaca 21) 252. – *Lipták,* Lubomír: Slovensko v 20. storočí [Slovakia in the 20th Century]. Bratislava 2011, 107. – *Lettrich,* Jozef: History of Modern Slovakia. Toronto 1955, 66.

[33] See, for example, *Johnson,* Owen: Slovakia 1918-1938. Education and the Making of a State. Boulder 1985 (East European Monographs 180) 88-90, 300-304. – *Bakke,* Elisabeth: Doomed to Failure? The Czechoslovak National Project and the Slovak Autonomist Reaction 1918-1939. PhD Dissertation, University of Oslo 1999, 425-426. – *Šuchová,* Xénia: Podiel slovákov v ústredných štátnych orgánoch v čase Hodžovho premiérstva [The Proportion of Slovaks in the Central State Organs during the Time of Hodža's Premiership]. In: Historický časopis 48 (2000) no. 4, 626-634. – *Macartney,* C. A.: Hungary and Her Successors. The Treaty of Trianon and Its Consequences 1919-1937. London 1937, 141.

[34] See, for example, *Krajčovičová,* Natália: Začiatky pozemkovej reformy na Slovensku v dvadsiatych rokoch [The Beginnings of the Land Reform in Slovakia in the 1920s]. In: Historický časopis 32 (1984) 574-592. – *Simon,* Attila: Telepesek és telepes falvak Dél-Szlovákiában a két világháború között [Colonists and Colonial Villages in Southern Slovakia between the Two World Wars]. Somorja 2009 (Nostra Tempora 15) 153-156. –

Throughout the interwar period, the Slovaks possessed a degree of political autonomy that many historians and social scientists underestimate. The staffs of the Slovak National Council and the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia were exclusively Slovak and came from across the political spectrum. From 1923 to 1928, Slovakia had six regions, each of which had a Slovak sheriff and a largely elected assembly, four of which never experienced an occasion when a single party had a majority of delegates. Thus, Slovak control of local government and interparty cooperation already was the norm in Slovakia in the 1920s.[35]

In 1927, the Czechoslovak National Assembly passed a sweeping reform of local government, which came into effect in 1928 and created four regional offices in Bohemia, Moravia-Silesia, Slovakia, and Ruthenia. Each had a president and an assembly of elected and appointed members, which had legislative powers equivalent to a government ministry and oversaw the activities of the presidents. Historians in Slovakia and elsewhere have downplayed this development as, at most, a positive step. They have insisted that, throughout the interwar period, Czechoslovakia remained a centralized, unitary state and that the clash between Slovak nationalists and advocates of direct rule from Prague fractured Slovak politics.[36] Almost alone among scholars, Róbert Letz (born 1967) asserted that the Slovak Provincial Assembly's establishment produced a "consensual effort" among Slovak politicians

Vnuk, František: Kriza vo vzťahoch. Praha – Vatikán v roku 1925 [Crisis in Relations. Prague – Vatican in 1925]. In: Historický zborník 9 (1999) 59-71. – *Bakke:* Doomed to Failure? 397-398, 425-426, 519 (cf. fn. 33). – *Maxwell,* Alexander: Choosing Slovakia. Slavic Hungary, the Czechoslovak Language, and Accidental Nationalism. London 2009 (International Library of Political Studies 37) 178-182. – *Zavacká,* Katarína: Právne systémy a tradície na Slovensku v období vzniku ČSR [Legal Systems and Traditions in Slovakia during the Creation of the Czechoslovak Republic]. In: Historický časopis 42 (1994) no. 2, 215-225. – *Macartney:* Hungary and Her Successors 133-141 (cf. fn. 33). – *Johnson:* Slovakia 1918-1938, 88-90, 300-301 (cf. fn. 33).

[35] *Šuchová,* Xénia: Idea Československého štátu na Slovensku 1918-1939 [The Idea of the Czechoslovak State in Slovakia, 1918-1939]. Bratislava 2011, 40-42. – See *Janas,* Karol: K činnosti Slovenskej ľudovej strany v regióne na príklade Považskej Bystrice [The Regional Activities of the Slovak People's Party in the Case of Považská Bystrica]. In: *Letz,* Róbert / *Mulík,* Peter / *Bartlová,* Alena (eds.): Slovenská ľudová strana v dejinách [The Slovak People's Party in History]. Martin 2006, 326-335. – *Lipscher,* Ladislav: K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku v rokoch 1918-1939 [The Emergence of the Political Administration in Slovakia 1918-1939]. Bratislava 1966, 114-116. – *Šuchová,* Xénia: Problémy organizácie politickej správy na Slovensku v predmníchovskej republike [Organizational Problems of the Political Administration in Slovakia in the pre-Munich Republic]. In: *Zemko / Bystrický:* Slovensko v Československu 103-107 (cf. fn. 32).

[36] See *Cambel,* Samuel (ed.): Dejiny Slovenska [The History of Slovakia]. Vol. 5: 1918-1945. Bratislava 1985, 143. – *Mikuš,* Jozef: Slovakia. A Political History. 1918-1950. Milwaukee/ Wisconsin 1963, 20-21. – *Kirschbaum,* Stanislav J.: A History of Slovakia. The Struggle for Survival. New York 1995, 160. – *Felak,* James: "At the Price of the Republic". Hlinka's Slovak People's Party 1929-1938. Pittsburgh 1994 (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies) 35. – *Čaplovič,* Dušan et al. (eds.): Dejiny Slovenska [The History of Slovakia]. Bratislava 2000, 226. – *Tome,* Peter D. / *Kováč,* Dušan: Slovakia. From Samo to Dzurinda. Stanford 2001 (Studies of Nationalities) 85-86. – *Heimann,* Mary: Czechoslovakia. The State that Failed. New Haven 2009, 54.

"to assist the economic and cultural development of Slovakia, regardless of their political persuasion".[37]

In the Slovak Provincial Assembly, which oversaw the work of the Provincial Office, no party ever obtained a majority of the 38 elected seats. The 18 delegates the central government appointed came from both government and opposition parties. The rationale for their selection was to take advantage of their technical abilities and to maintain a delicate ideological balance. In the end, roughly half the seats in the assembly and precisely half the seats on the various subcommittees that drafted policy were in the hands of parties that supported the governing coalitions in Prague, while the remainder went to a range of opposition parties, including representatives of the Hungarian, German, Jewish, and Rusyn minorities.[38] In this sense, the Slovak Provincial Assembly operated on the principles of a Lijphartian grand coalition.

Interparty cooperation was the norm, resulting in debate that was of a high quality and usually free from political grandstanding. Although the president of the Provincial Office had the power to issue decrees, comparable to the heads of all central government ministries, he ensured that his decisions had the input and support of all parties, whose representatives scrutinized and debated all proposals. For example, although the Provincial Office had no revenue-generating powers, each year it drafted a budget and negotiated the total outlay with the central government in Prague. The draft budget then went to the Provincial Assembly for deliberation, which provided an opportunity for the assembly's members to engage in a wide-ranging debate that touched on all policy areas of the central and regional governments. Representatives raised and addressed complaints, put forth amendments, and voted on the constituent parts of the budget and the budget as a whole.

Every budget obtained the approval of the majority of the elected members of the Provincial Assembly, including representatives of the opposition parties. That backing usually was overwhelming. Allowing the opposition parties to help draft the budget, extract concessions, and exert a de facto veto, all behind closed doors, cemented broad support for the budget.[39] This arrangement broke down on only

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[37] *Letz,* Róbert: Slovenské dejiny [Slovak History]. Vol. 4: 1914-1938. Bratislava 2010, 180. See also *Bartlová,* Alena / *Thurzo,* Ivan: Slovenský perikles [Slovak Pericles]. Bratislava 2009, 189-190.

[38] For a detailed summary of the powers of the Provincial Office, see *Šuchová,* Xénia: Za vedenie krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku roku 1928. Kompetencie a prvé rozpočty [The Introduction of the Provincial System in 1928. Competencies and the First Budget]. In: Historický časopis 45 (1997) no. 3, 487-304. – See also *Šuchová* (comp.): Prílohy II – Politický systém [Addendum II – Political System]. In: *Zemko / Bystrický:* Slovensko v Československu 581-588 (cf. fn. 32). – *Bartlová,* Alena: Niektoré nové prvky v politickom systéme ČSR a v politickom živote Slovenska na prelome 20. a 30. rokov [Some New Elements in the Political System in Czechoslovakia and the Political Life of Slovakia at the Turn of the 1920s and the 1930s]. In: Studia Historica Nitriensia 3 (1995) 97-107, here 102. – *Lipscher:* K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku 176 (cf. fn. 35). – The reports of the British Foreign Office from 1929 in the National Archives, Foreign Office (FO), 371, 13579/156-158 and 13580/97-122.

[39] *Pocisk,* Jozef: Funkcia krajinského prezidenta a krátke medailónky osobností úradu [The

one occasion. In 1933, the leading opposition party, the HSĽS, voted against the budget to protest the arrest of its supporters who had disrupted an official celebration of Slovakia's Christianization. In response, the authorities first postponed and then abandoned judicial proceedings against those in custody, and the HSĽS voted for the budget in every subsequent year.[40]

The increase in the powers and influence, from 1929 to 1939, of the Slovak Provincial Office underlined its effectiveness.[41] It employed a growing number of officials, established a series of branch offices across Slovakia, took control of a number of quasi-official associations, oversaw and published the first systematic program for research into economic and social conditions in Slovakia, introduced a new transparency policy for Slovak local government by publishing its decisions and deliberations, and invested heavily in the modernization of Slovakia's infrastructure. Politicians from across the political spectrum lauded all of these achievements.[42]

The depictions of the First Czechoslovak Republic as a centralized state are clearly wide of the mark. There was a broad consensus among Slovak politicians in support of Slovakia's incorporation within Czechoslovakia. In return, the Slovaks benefitted from the expansion of the suffrage and the new freedoms of speech and assembly, enjoyed a cultural renaissance, influenced the central government's policy making, and possessed their own vigorous and influential local government. A vocal autonomist movement existed, to be sure, but its rhetoric must not mask the existence of a tradition of compromise, which consociational theory illuminates.[43]

Concluding Remarks

The histories of Imperial Austria and the Czechoslovak First Republic demonstrate the evolution of consociational democracy in Central Europe, both in terms of its

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Function of the Provincial President and Short Medallions about the Personalities of the Office]. In: *Péková,* Monika (ed.): 80 výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku [The 80th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Provincial System in Slovakia] (CD-ROM). Bratislava 2008, 4-5. – See also *Šuchová:* Idea Československého štátu na Slovensku 151-165 (cf. fn. 35). – *Lipscher:* K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku 175-176 (cf. fn. 35). – For more on the debates about the annual budget, see: Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko, 20 April 1937.

[40] National Archives of Great Britain, FO, 371 (Political Department, General Correspondence)/19495 (from 1935). – *Felak:* "At the Price of the Republic" 101-111 (cf. fn. 36).

[41] *Nováková,* Veronika: Kompetencia okresných úradov z hľadiska krajského úradu [The Competencies of the District Offices with Respect to the Provincial Office]. In: *Péková:* 80 výročie uzákonenia krajinského zriadenia na Slovensku 1-2 (cf. fn. 39). – See also *Bielek,* František/*Kalovsková,* Zlata: Hospodársky úrad pre Slovensko 1918-1928 [The Economic Office for Slovakia 1918-1928]. Inventár a katalóg [Inventory and Catalog]. Bratislava 1974, 1. – *Bartlová:* Niektoré nový prvky v politickom systéme ČSR 102-103 (cf. fn. 38). – *Johnson:* Slovakia 1918-1938, 441 (cf. fn. 33). – *Lipscher:* K vývinu politickej správy na Slovensku 172-173 (cf. fn. 35).

[42] Krajinský vestník pre Slovensko, 10 January 1936.

[43] Autonomy was not only a demand of many Slovaks but also Rusyns. Unfortunately, space prohibits a full consideration of the applicability of the consociational model to Ruthenia during the interwar years.

strengthening, in areas where it was once in its nascent form, and in the extension of its geographical reach into the former Hungarian areas of Slovakia and Ruthenia. In the years before the First World War, Imperial Austria, a proto-consociational semi-democracy, displayed some features of consociational democracy. Its governments approximated the Lijphartian grand coalition model. Elections were increasingly proportional, not only for the Reichsrat but also in the regional interethnic compromises as well as in civil service appointments and education. The diets in the crown lands and the influence localities had on the schools institutionalized a degree of group autonomy. The scuttling of certain policies, frequently through seemingly unconstructive legislative obstruction, pointed toward the principle of mutual veto. These four traits of consociationalism intensified after 1918, as the Czechoslovak First Republic gradually became a fully consociational democracy. The politicians of the republic commonly constructed some form of Lijphartian grand coalition when building cabinets, a pattern that extended to the extraconstitutional and extraparliamentary groups of party leaders and then, beginning in 1929, to the Political Committees of the cabinets. As in Imperial Austria, proportionality was evident in the legislative elections, but it appeared in many other aspects of society, including civic associations. After 1918, there were small steps toward autonomy for Slovakia and Ruthenia, and the 1927 provincial law was a major step in that direction. Mutual vetoes no longer meant obstruction, as they once did in Imperial Austria, but merely a threat to the amiability of the parties within a Lijphartian grand coalition, and logrolling enabled both sides to enact what otherwise might have been controversial policies. Within Czechoslovakia, the spirit of consociationalism extended to the Slovaks and Rusyns, who, during the latter years of the Kingdom of Hungary, had little experience with building compromises. In particular, the Slovaks, either as individual politicians in various parties or through the HSĽS, joined in the Lijphartian grand coalitions that governed the state. Aside from elections, proportionality was manifested in the Provincial Assemblies. Similarly, the negotiations for the Slovak budgets, after 1927, demonstrated that the opposition parties wielded an informal veto. All the parties involved in drafting the budget extracted concessions and always reached a consensus. The process demonstrated that the Provincial Assemblies (even more than the Ministry with Full Power for the Administration of Slovakia) and the local governing of the schools were advancements in Slovak autonomy.

The consociational model has served as a tool to explain the success of democracy in deeply divided societies and to resolve conflict in such places as Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Ireland, and South Africa. It can also serve as an analytical tool, suggesting ways in which existing consociational states might deepen the consociational experience, in order to better accommodate all the segments of their societies. The model gains additional usefulness through its application to historical cases. Examining consociationalism's historic roots in Austria-Hungary and interwar Czechoslovakia enables researchers to understand its origins and to account for the consociational features that emerged in Austria after 1945, in Czechoslovakia after the fall of communism in 1989, and after 1993, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Furthermore, applying the consociational model corrects some of the

errors of interpretation, which are present in the historical literature, that dismiss the democratic aspects and significance of pre-1914 Austrian politics and portray the democracy of the Czechoslovak First Republic as defective or merely a case of Czech domination. No state perfectly employs consociationalism, nor does consociationalism preclude the failure of democracy. When deeply divided societies struggle to adopt democratic ideals, as did Imperial Austria, or when a consociational democracy stumbles, as with interwar Czechoslovakia, which could have done more to integrate Slovaks, Germans, Rusyns, Hungarians, and other minorities into the state structure, the consociational model provides an instrument to gauge shortcomings. Democracy is not synonymous with majoritarianism, and stable democracy is possible in deeply divided societies. Given the great variety of institutional arrangements that might be deemed democratic and the particular demands of deeply divided societies, it is crucial that historians and social scientists appraise both democratic success and failures with the appropriate standard. When used as a tool to view the past, consociationalism can provide not only a means of assessing the progress of a deeply divided society toward building democracy but also the correct reasons why forays into democratic politics in such a polity failed.