THE CONSTITUTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN CRISIS: THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE 1848 REVOLUTION FOR UFFO HORN’S ‘NATIONAL HERMAPHRODITISM’

In his path-breaking study of Nationalism and Sexuality, George Mosse described the curious evolution of European cultural reactions to the image of the hermaphrodite over the course of the 19th century. At the beginning of the century, in the midst of Europe’s romanticist fever, the hermaphrodite, or “androgyne,” was prized as a cultural ideal, as the apotheosis of harmony, the union of spirit and material. Before the end of the same century, however, the idea of a “Zwitter” was being scorned as an unnatural monstrosity, a violation of purity and the integrity of identity. Mosse provocatively suggests a link between this shift in attitudes toward human sexuality and the development of nationalism, with its fixation on propriety and its abhorrence of ambivalence and ambiguity.

In fact, Mosse’s linkage is paralleled by the use of the term “hermaphrodite” by 19th-century nationalists themselves throughout the Habsburg monarchy to refer to any person who showed a propensity to remain “undecided” in national identity, to switch back and forth between identities (e.g. on government censuses), and in general to resist categorization into a single, unambiguous ethnic-national identity. The source of tremendous indignation and frustration for 19th-century nationalists, these “national hermaphrodites” (sometimes also “amphibians”), as recent scholarship has shown convincingly, represented in fact a large proportion of the population, whether on the rural “language frontier,” in the cities, among the bourgeois elites or among the peasantry or working classes, often into the 20th century.
Most of this scholarship, recognizing the prevalence of this stubborn resistance to the nationalizing project of the monarchy’s nationalists, has tended to assume that, if these populations were not the rigidly nationalized carriers of the kind of unambiguously monopolized ethnic-national identity of nationalist imagination, then they must have possessed no national or ethnic identity of any sort. Austrian society, in this view, leapt from the “non-” or “anationalist” to the nationalist entirely through the efforts of ideological nationalist activists. The nationalists’ ubiquitous complaints about “hermaphrodites,” “amphibians,” and “side-switchers” are understood to be actually nothing more than the nationalist imagination’s inability to countenance or even comprehend a non-nationalized environment, coupled with the natural tendency of individuals with no national identity at all to assent to now this, now that national identification for purely practical, opportunistic reasons.\(^4\)

But the nationalists’ own use of the term “hermaphrodite” suggests a somewhat more complicated, and more interesting situation. As is implicit in Mosse’s simile about sexual hermaphrodites, the reality of national hermaphroditism is more about ambiguity than indifference; more about multiplicity than absence of identity. In fact, a close examination of early-nationalizing Austrian society, prior to the triumph of exclusivistic nationalism during the late-19th century, reveals that an entire generation of poets, writers, and thinkers of various types, far from being “anational” carriers simply of traditional identities based on locale, occupation, estate, confession, etc., actually exhibited a very powerful kind of national identification, but one that acknowledged and joyfully embraced multiple linguistic and ethnic-national identities. Rather than the exclusivistic and Other-hostile polarization which is, and with good reason, associated with the triumphant nationalism of late-19th and 20th century Central Europe, we see in early- and mid-19th century Austria a nationalism which was, rather, open, inclusive and ecstatically ecumenical, even promiscuous, with regard to the emerging ideas about ethnic-national identities. This is not, I hasten to add, intended to suggest that national identities are any less social constructions; only that the way in which those constructs were created and employed was not as simple and sudden, the road from the pre-national to the nationalist not as direct and smooth, as has generally been supposed.

But this happily promiscuous, “hermaphroditic” stage of national identification obviously did not survive for long. In fact what generally brings the “hermaphrodites,” “amphibians,” and “side-switchers” to our attention in the historical record is their conflict with the nationalists and the increasing pressure, both ideological and institutional, on such individuals to “choose” an identity and “become” either German, or Czech, or Polish, or Italian, etc. One of the earliest and clearest instances of this sort of conflict is provided by the 1848 revolutions, which constituted not only a severe political and social crisis, but also a profound crisis – literally a “turning point” – in the possibilities for nationality and personal identification. In the course of the exhilarating upheavals of that year, self-conscious “hermaphrodites”

\(^4\) Jeremy King is a good example of the tendency for even scholarship of the highest order to proceed on the basis of this kind of assumption. *King: Budweisers into Czechs and Germans* (cf. fn. 3).
like the Bohemian writer Uffo Horn, under the pressure of the growing tension between liberal, radical, and reaction, which were overlaid by the positing of a tension between Czechs and Germans by nationalists on both sides, found themselves increasingly forced to choose sides, to adopt a clear identity which was not only single and unambiguous, but which explicitly excluded the national “Other.”

This historical reality, the triumph of exclusivistic mono-nationalisms in Austria— which was experienced by the “hermaphrodites” in many cases with deep sadness and sense of loss— has tended to reinforce theories about this being the essential nature of nationalism, and to lead to arguments about the failure of liberal politics to manage the transition to an open, mass-democratic society. Both interpretations tend to dismiss the existence of the “hermaphrodites” and “amphibians” as being either in fact “non-national” actors, or aberrations, just as the nationalists of the time did. But much recent scholarship is beginning to suggest that this history might at least in part be more about the essential nature of liberal democratic society, rather than nationalism per se; related as much to the success of liberal-democracy as to its failure. The collapse of the liberal-democratic dream of 1848, replaced by mutually intolerant and hostile Czech and German nationalisms, and the disappearance of a public space for the expression of “national hermaphroditism” thus could in fact be understood not so much as proof of the essentially illiberal nature of nationalism, but rather of the essentially intolerant and exclusivistic requirements of liberal democracy.

Uffo Horn was a perfect example of the nationalists’ definition of a “Zwitter.” The Sudeten-German nationalist historian Josef Pfitzner, writing in the 1920s, described “nationale Zwitter” as the products of a “Berührungsumwandlung verschiedener Kulturwelten und Völkerschaften,” individuals, “die hart auf dem Grenzsaume wachsen, […] so daß eine Einreihung in ein bestimmtes Lager geradezu unmöglich wird.” Born in 1817 in Trautenau/Trutnov, in northeastern Bohemia, he grew up in

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6 Pfitzner, Josef: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen im Spiegel ihres Schrifttums bis zum Jahre 1848. Augsburg 1926, 300. Pfitzner himself grew up in a region “hart auf dem Grenzsaume” in Austrian Silesia in the early decades of the 20th century, although he never appears to have experienced the kind of ethnic-identity “confusion” that he attributes to the “Zwitter.” He maintained a vibrant interest in Czech/Bohemian history, and learned to speak passable Czech; however, there seems to have never been any doubt in his mind that he “was,” and only could be a German. Alena Mišková reports that the young Pfitzner already in secondary school exhibited an overt affiliation with German nationalism: Brandes, Detlef / Mišková, Alena: Vom Osteuropa-Lehrstuhl ins Prager Rathaus. Josef Pfitzner 1901-1945. Essen 2013, 21. Indeed, it is part of the argument here that while the type of “hermaphroditic” national identity displayed by Uffo Horn was possible, even fashionable, in the mid-19th century, it was by the late-19th and certainly 20th century no longer possible. On Josef Pfitzner, see also: Hadler, Frank / Šustek, Vojtěch: Josef Pfitzner (1901-1945) Historiker. Geschichtsprofessor und Geschichtspolitiker. In: Glettler, Monika / Mišková, Alena: Prager Professoren 1938-1948. Zwischen Wissenschaft und Politik. Essen
a social milieu that was predominantly German-speaking, while his parents’ origins suggest Polish- and Czech-speaking backgrounds. According to Pfitzner, his father had settled in Bohemia from Polish-speaking Galicia during the Napoleonic wars and married a woman from Blatten, in an overwhelmingly Czech-speaking region. Thus Pfitzner on Horn’s multiple linguistic heritage: “Slawischer Laut klang ihm aus Muttermund, frohe Jugendgespielen jauchzten deutsche Kinderlieder.”

We have no way of knowing whether Horn’s childhood was actually so “utraquis-tic,” although in fact his multiple identity prior to the 1848 revolution probably had as much to do with the prevailing political and literary trends of his generation: liberalism and romanticism. As a student in Prague, Horn became a passionate supporter of the liberal cause, and in fact founded a liberal political club there. Like so many other intellectuals of the Vormärz in Austria and the German states, Horn’s freedom-loving liberalism was inseparable from a commitment to the creation of a Greater German nation-state. A great admirer of Schiller and Goethe, Horn saw himself as operating within a single greater German Kulturraum, whose Germanness was equated with the liberal values of freedom, universalism, and civilization. While still in Prague he became a member of the Allgemeine Deutsche Burschenschaft, and during a break in his studies he spent several years crisscrossing “Germany,” from Vienna, through Dresden (where he found himself involved in a pistol duel, badly wounded, and as a result sentenced to several months in jail) and Leipzig, finally to Hamburg. Throughout his travels, Horn met with the leading lights of the then blossoming German literary Romantik, including with Ludwig Tieck. So filled with the liberal-romantic Wartburggeist or Young German spirit of those years was Horn, that he even uses a poem mourning the victims of the great Hamburg fire of 1842 to give voice to his yearning for a united Germany:

Ach es sollte nicht grünen und keimen
Hoch der Wald von Maien Bäumen,
Den du plantest in seligen Träumen:
’Deutschland werde ein einiges sein!’


8 Marx: Uffo Daniel Horn 353 (cf. fn. 7).


The human tragedy he was responding to seemed to have caused him, momentar-
ily, to doubt the possibility of achieving the dream, but it clearly did nothing to
dampen his ardor for the Greater German national dream itself.

All of this Pfitzner takes – with evident relief – as proof of Horn’s essentially
‘healthy’ German nature, and the foundation for the “German” choices that he will
make during the 1848 revolution. But with palpable sadness, and some degree of
scorn (for example for the influence of Horn’s grandmother, according to Pfitzner a
“heißblütige, mit glühendem Deutschenhass erfüllte Polin,”11), Pfitzner is forced to
acknowledge how virtually all of the early-19th century writers he was attempting
to claim for “Sudeten-Germandom,” their “clear German spirit” befuddled by
romanticism, were in fact depressingly Slavophilic, caught up in the general excite-
ment for the new scholarship and discoveries pertaining to Czech history, ethnology,
and mythology.12 Horn, for example, whose interest in the ancient Bohemian leg-
ends was spurred by his meetings with the likes of Ludwig Tieck, combined his
liberal love for the German idea with an ardent identification with his Bohemian
homeland, which he identified explicitly as Czech/Slavic. Even during his rapturous
pilgrimage through Germany, Horn described himself as feeling like a “refugee,” and
described Bohemia as his true “Fatherland”:

Wenn meines Volks Trompeten klingen,
Muß ich zurück ins Vaterland!13

That he understood this Bohemian fatherland to be not merely a branch of a larg-
er German Volk, but rather as specifically Slavic and Czech is visible in a short self-
description he wrote while in Hamburg for his Österreichischer Parnaß, which
shows, too, his romantic inclinations:

Lang, athletisch, grobe Züge, moderne Frisur, macht sich überall bemerkbar, leidenschaftlich-
er Mazurtänzer, tobt und rast im Leben wie in der Poesie, Dichternatur noch in der Brause,
aus welcher sich vielleicht eine schöne Form absetzen wird, wenig Erfindung, schneller Vers-
macher, im Umgange angenehm, eitel darauf, viel Glück, besonders bei Frauen; schauspielt
stets, citirt häufig; singt ohne musikalisches Gehör (entsetzlich), trinkt gern Bier, ist burschikos
und Czeche – zuweilen stolz und anmaßend – handelt auch aus Bravour – lebt in Hamburg.14

The complex, yet very close relationship between Horn’s Czech and German
identities can be seen in virtually all of his literary output from this period. In 1836,
at the age of nineteen, Horn had written several shorter works dealing with old
Slavic legends. König Otakar, for example, took as its subject the mythical 13th-cen-
tury Bohemian King, Přemysl Otakar II. The historical Otakar (in German Ottokar)
had through a series of military conquests expanded the domains of his family, the
Přemyslids, as far as Carinthia, Carniola, Styria, Austria and Silesia, and had even

11 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 301 (cf. fn. 6).
12 Ibid. 103.
13 von Langer (ed.): Gesammelte Werke von Uffo Horn 8 (cf. fn. 10), cited from: Pfitzner: Das
Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 306-307 (cf. fn. 6).
14 Horn, Uffo: Österreichischer Parnaß, bestiegen von einem heruntergekommenen Antiquar
fn. 6).
conducted campaigns against the pagans of Prussia. Otakar’s success and ambition eventually aroused the fear, and jealousy, of the Habsburg ruler, Rudolf, who finally defeated Otakar in 1278 at the battle of Dürnkrut. The wars between Rudolf and Otakar, of course, would have had nothing of the national about them. It was a purely dynastic-political contest, not a nationalistic or even ethnic one; in consciousness and purpose it had to do not with Czechs and Germans, but rather with members and subjects of this or that aristocratic house and their lands. And it was essentially in this light that the great Austrian dramatist Franz Grillparzer imagined Otakar’s fate in his König Ottokars Glück und Ende, which was performed for the first time in Vienna in 1825. Twenty-six years older than Horn, and a devoted, Habsburgtreuer Austrian, Grillparzer was no admirer of nationalism or the principle of nationality – what he derided as “die lächerliche Nationalitätenfrage”. He famously, or infamously, penned the scathing verse,

Der Weg der neueren Bildung geht
Von Humanität
Durch Nationalität
Zur Bestialität.”

Grillparzer’s Ottokar was, of course, a Czech, and the negative depiction of that character elicited angry protests from Czech students, officials and liberal-nationalists. The complaints baffled Grillparzer, however. To the classicist-minded playwright, his Ottokar represented not Czechness per se, which, we must recall, he considered a “lächerliches” principle for political or social organization, but rather a certain personality or ruler-type; a universal principle of moral and political behavior. König Ottokars Glück und Ende had been written as a barely masked critique of Napoleon’s egocentric Machtsucht, with Ottokar juxtaposed to the Habsburg Rudolf, depicted as an apostle of duty and service, the submission of personal ego to universal principle and morality.

Horn certainly would have been familiar with Grillparzer’s drama, which enjoyed tremendous popularity throughout Austria, even if more infamy within sectors of the Bohemian population. But in Horn’s hands the story and its characters receive much more decidedly enunciated national identities. In his drama, as King Otakar victoriously reaches the coast of the Baltic Sea, Horn has him declaim:

“Dies Meer muß mein, muß meines Reiches Gränze
Für alle Zeiten sein – im Nebel dort
Verbergen sich die Holme der Normanen
Jenseits der Küste wohnt ein fremder Stamm,
Doch dieses Ufer soll der Slaven sein!”

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16 Ibid.
It is a vision of a world divided into clearly demarcated, ethnically identified countries; a nationalist mapping of the natural topography. Rather than a feudal conflict between lord and vassal, or between personal egomania and universalistic duty, Horn gives us a struggle between two entirely different, ethnically identified, and to each other entirely foreign peoples, with Otakar responding to Rudolf’s claims:

“Was kümmert Eures Reiches Noth und Drangsal
Den fremden König, der in andrer Sprache,
In and’ren Sitten lebt – den fremden Stamm,
Durch keine Bande Euch verpflichtet ist.”

A nationally conscious tone *per se* could hardly have been offensive to the nationalist writer Pfitzner, and indeed he praised *König Otakar* as the “high point” of Horn’s literary career. But Horn’s “hermaphroditic” passions lead Pfitzner to simultaneously condemn Horn’s pro-Czech sympathies, accusing him of turning Otakar into a “nationalbewußte[r], von Deutschenhaß erfüllte[r] tschechische[r] Volks-könig.”

And, indeed, in the figure of Řičan, the king’s advisor, the play does in fact give voice to something of an anti-German attitude. “Nie soll der Böhme einem Deutschen trau’n,” Řičan demands; “Wer nicht die Deutschen haßt, der ist kein Böhme.”

Interesting here is the differentiation not between Germans and Czechs, but between Germans and Bohemians, apparently acknowledging Bohemia as an inherently Czech land, rather than a land of both Czech and German languages or cultures. A true romantic nationalist, Řičan pleads with his king to leave the “foreign” German lands and return to the “natural” borders of Bohemia, and even that he decline the emperor’s crown, which could only result in a dependence on “foreigners”:

„O wirf sie doch von Dir, die böse Last
Und sei der König Deines treuen Volks,
Du selbst ein Slave, halt’ an Deinen Stamm!
[…]
Und nimmer wird ein König aus dem Stämme
Der Slaven huld’gend seine Kniee beugen
Vor einem—der die deutsche Krone trägt!”

Where the historical Otakar was kept from “German” lands only through military defeat, Horn’s Otakar is persuaded by his advisor’s logic, and voluntarily retreats from his recent conquests, agreeing to a complete separation between the two “foreign” peoples.

„Keine neuen Sterne sollen aufgeh’n meinem Volke,
Erfüllt hab’ ich den Wunsch, den ihr gehegt,
Zu scheiden Euch vom fremden Stamm der Deutschen,
Und Herrscher will ich sein des großen Volks,
Dem dieses Welttheils Hälfte angehört,
Die zugewendet liegt der Morgenröthe.”

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19 Pfitzner: *Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen* 310 (cf. fn. 6).
20 Ibid. 308.
21 Ibid. 309.
22 Ibid. 309-311.
23 Ibid. 311.
But while the figure of Řičan does certainly seem to express a straightforwardly monolithic form of nationalist identity, Horn ultimately counters that, at least partially, with the king’s somewhat more ecumenical feelings. While he sees Bohemia as plainly, and apparently exclusively, Slavic, he does nevertheless call the Prussian a “blood-relative” of the Czechs:

„Der Preuße soll nicht seines Blutsverwandten,
Des Čechen Sklav’, er soll sein Bruder sein!“ 24

Ultimately, of course, even the wildly romantic Horn had to bow at least minimally to actual history, and his Otakar had to be defeated by Rudolf. But where stricter Czech nationalists might be wont to interpret the defeated king as an underdog-hero, the symbol of their current subjugation by the Austrians, Horn, with a nod to Grillparzer, places his sympathies clearly with Rudolf. Like Grillparzer, Horn sees Otakar as a tragic figure, brought down at least in part by his own tragic flaws; but in Horn’s version, those flaws are not so much based on personal virtue, as on the purblind national egocentrism of radical, mono-nationalism. Where Grillparzer presents a vision of an anational world where ethnic-linguistic differences are essentially accidental and irrelevant, Horn gives us a much more sensitive and nuanced appreciation of the value of all nationalities, even as he warns against the exclusivistic domination of any one.

In a poem published the same year as König Otakar, Horn goes a step further in seeing a, in national terms, “German” quality to Bohemia. On the occasion of the opening of the Vienna-Prague railway, Horn composed a poem, a paean to the city of Prague, incorporating images of both the Oak and the Linden, the symbols of German and Czech nationalisms.

„Wie staatlich prangt die Slawenfürstin heute,
Zur Braut verjüngt erscheint die alte Stadt,
Und sieh! im blanken Harnisch ihr zur Seite
Ihr Paladin, der graue Wissehrad.
Vier Stadtjungfrauen bilden ihr Geleite,
Das Haupt bekränzt mit frischem Eichenblatt—
Der Mutter heiß!—die einen solchen Reigen
Holdsel’ger Töchter kann dem Volke zeigen!
[…]
Prag! Mutter Prag! um deren graue Locken
Sich heut’ ein Kranz von blüh’nden Rosen zieht,
Blick auf und horch dem vollen Klang der Glocken
Und auf der Zeit geheimnisvolles Lied.
Die Zukunft spielt an ihrem goldnen Rocken—
Libussas Baum, die heil’ge Linde blüh’.“ 25

Pride of place is clearly given here to the “holy Linden,” and it is interesting to note its association in the poem with “the future.” But the German oak-leaf wreath,

24 Ibid. 309.
25 von Langer (ed.): Gesammelte Werke von Uffo Horn 90 (cf. fn. 10), cited from: Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 311 (cf. fn. 6). Libussa (in Czech Libuše) was the youngest daughter of Čech, the mythical progenitor of the Czech nation, and was said to be the founder of Prague.
too, has its noble place in the metaphorical pageant – and in 1836 there can be no mistaking the national intent of the image – crowning the head of the “Slavic princess,” Prague.

The young Uffo Horn unmistakably identified as a Czech, as he identified Bohemia itself with the Czechs and the larger Slavic world. And it is perhaps indicative of the trend of things to come, anticipating the Czech nationalist motto, “Svůj k svému” (each to his own), that his Otakar so emphatically insists on the separation and clear demarcation of Czechs and Germans, one from the other. And yet Horn’s own life was a good deal more ambiguous – even before his career as a German nationalist politician during the 1848 crisis. Horn may have felt himself and his homeland at this stage to be Czech, but that didn’t stop him from recognizing, and celebrating, in virtually all of his poetry and dramatic works, a German contribution and element to those identities. Personally, too, his worship of German classicist and romanticist writers, and his long sojourns in various parts of the German lands, while certainly not yet indicating the adoption of a German identity, are nevertheless strong evidence of a flexibility and ecumenicalism in identity quite unlike that of the more rigid nationalism of the end of the century.

For Pfitzner this was simply the result of Horn’s Slavic parentage. But Horn was no exception; as Pfitzner’s own observations unwittingly make clear, even the – in Pfitzner’s view – most unambiguously “Sudeten-German” writers of this generation showed unmistakable “hermaphroditic” tendencies. With apologetic explanations about the somnolence of German national spirit at the time, combined with greater Czech self-centeredness and fanaticism as compared with greater German ecumenicalism, and/or greater state repression of German nationalism than of Czech nationalism, Pfitzner explains how these intellectuals “hatte nicht die Kraft dem Zwange der Zeit und des Systems zu widerstehen und besondere, rein deutsch-böhmische Wege zu gehen,” and instead, under the influence of the era’s romanticism, celebrated Bohemia’s double ethnic-national identity.

Even as the early Czech linguistic pioneers were translating Schiller into Czech, so German-language writers were enthusiastically and with a palpable sense of pride immersing themselves in the medieval Slavic legends. It is at least partly in this sense that the rise in critical historiography, philology, and the romantically inspired interest in Czech ethnography which made up the Czech národní obrození, or “National Revival,” ought to be understood. During the last years of the 18th and the first couple of decades of the 19th centuries, Bohemian scholars and literati of both languages turned their attention to a study of the Czech language, history, and folklore. Although the “National Revival” did provide the foundation for the self-consciously political and ethno-linguistic Czech nationalist movement later in the century, it is important to understand that the original impetus of the movement was not political, and was far from exclusively identified with, or by native Czech-speakers. The overt conception of the “nation” continued to be heavily determined by historical-territorial considerations, even as they were being subtly undermined by the new ethnic and linguistic interests. The Czech/Bohemian nation could at that point still

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26 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 153 (cf. fn. 6).
be conceived simply as the nation of those inhabiting Bohemia. The ancient Slavs were accordingly considered the common ancestors of all those inhabitants, and the Czech language their proper language, regardless of the language they grew up speaking. Similarly, the efforts of scholars like Josef Jungmann and Josef Dobrovský to revive Bohemia’s Slavic, Czech past and language were in no way meant by these earlier scholars to cast doubt on Bohemia’s historic status as an integral part of what was still considered the larger German *Kulturraum.* Thus, one early such bi-ethnic intellectual, one of the most influential early supporters of the Czech language, Count Franz Josef Kinsky, called himself a “Bohemian,” proclaimed that the mother tongue of any Bohemian must be Czech, yet defended the use of German too and referred to it as his “own language.” Another, Joseph Anton Ritter von Rieger, insisted that both Czech- and German-speakers must be considered “Bohemians by birth and country.”

This was a generation very much under the influence of the ecumenical teachings of the Prague spiritual philosopher Bernard Bolzano, including, as Jiří Kořalka has documented, the later strident Czech nationalist, František Palacký. But where Bolzano preached more a type of traditional state-focused “Landespatriotismus”—he wrote, for example, that the two peoples of Bohemia should receive equal rights, but that whoever could eliminate/eradicate Bohemia’s linguistic diversity, so that the inhabitants would have only one language, “der würde der größte Wohlthäter unsers Volkes werden”—the younger generation of Bohemian intellectuals like Horn, Ebert and even the younger Palacký not only acknowledged Bohemia’s linguistic and cultural diversity, they positively embraced and celebrated it. In the Czech National Revival’s evolution to a modern nationalism, some proponents earlier than

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27 The most complete study in English of the Czech “National Revival,” sometimes also referred to as the “National Renascence,” is *Agnèu,* Hugh LeCaine: Origins of the Czech National Renascence. Pittsburgh 1993. Agnew makes clear that much of the early impetus to this new interest, particularly in the eighteenth century, had little to do with any specifically Czech “national” interest, but flowed more out of larger European scholarly trends related to the Enlightenment. Similar arguments have been made by *Křen,* Jan: Die Konfliktgemeinschaft. Tschechen und Deutsche 1780-1918. München 1996 (Veröffentlichungen des Collegium Carolinum 71). Křen argues even more explicitly that the Czech “national renaisance” was originally motivated by an admiring imitation of German intellectual and literary trends.


others adopted recognizably nationalist positions, drawing a more clearly demarcated distinction between Czechs and Germans per se, and claiming the Bohemian state and history exclusively for the former – Palacký can be put in this category by the mid-1830s, as can the young Karel Havelček Borovský. But for probably most educated Bohemians, their homeland’s history and identity remained well into the 1840s (and for many even beyond), open to both languages and cultural groups; both inherently Slavic and integrally connected to the larger “German” world. Throughout the first half of the 19th century, the poets and literati of Bohemia of both languages freely dipped into the “ethnic” springs of both cultures for their inspiration and material. The ideals of the historical-territorial Bohemian Landespatriotismus fully allowed both Czech and German speakers to embrace as shared “national” heroes the likes of Charles IV, St. John Nepomuk, or the Hussite hero Jan Žižka.

Even a later figure like Karl Egon Ebert, who was probably the best known “German-Bohemian” writer of his generation, and someone whose “deutsche Gesinnung” according to Pfitzner could never be doubted, devoted most of his literary output to a variety of folk legends from both the Germanic and Slavic lands. His masterpiece, the 1825 Wlasta, which he very interestingly subtitled a “Bohemian-national hero story,” took as its subject the Bohemian legend of a Mägdekrieg, a “war of the Bohemian/Czech maidens,” the descendants of Libuše, against a host of male invaders into their homeland. According to Pfitzner, the publication of Wlasta, written in German, loosed a regular “Wlasta-Fever” in Prague akin to the “Werther-Fever” created in the 1770s by the publication of Goethe’s Die Leiden des jungen Werthers. But, in Pfitzner’s account of it, in an exact reversal of his complaint of Horn’s König Otakar, Ebert has practically “denationalized” (entnationalisiert) the legend, rooting it more in a romantically inspired humanitarianism than in any pro-Czech, anti-German partisanship – indeed the words “German” and “Czech” appear not once in the 300-page epic. The object of Ebert’s adulation in Wlasta is rather the common homeland, “the beautiful, great fatherland,” Bohemia itself.

Ihr Berge, stolze Berge, du schwarze Wäldernacht,
Ihr goldenerfüllten Ströme, Ihr Auen in grüner Pracht,
Ihr sanft gewölbten Hügel in blumigem Gewand,
Euch nenn ich, freudig rufend, mein schönes Vaterland.

34 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 152 (cf. fn. 6).
It was a "Heimatgedicht," but one which shows what Pfitzner, with a certain sense of disapproval, calls a "völkisch unentschiedenes Gedicht." 37

The choice of words here is telling: nationally undecided. What is most important for my purposes here about the identities of Horn and Ebert and other Bohemian writers like them during this period, is that they identify with, not an artificial, abstract Bohemia devoid of its native cultures, but one which acknowledges and embraces both cultures, both languages, without feeling any compulsion to "choose" one over the other. Ebert's poem may not identify German and Czech by name, but it is a self-conscious embrace of Bohemia's Slavic past by a German-speaking poet. This is neither any longer a decultured, purely geographical Landes-patriotismus, nor yet a national identity in which culture is mobilized and fetishized in a hegemonic, exclusivistic, and nationalistic manner. This can be seen even more clearly in Ebert's two poems following Wlasta – Břetislaw und Jutta and Čestmir, written between 1825 and 1835. Both works again reach back to the misty Slavic legends of Bohemia's past, but unlike Wlasta, these two not only identify Germans and Czechs as such; they treat the relationship, and tensions, between the two as their central theme. Nevertheless, both Germans and Czechs are identified with Bohemia.

In the former work, for example, Břetislaw is a Czech and Jutta his German lover. In one scene he says to one of her relations:

Ja laßt uns treue Brüder sein von Allen,
Die dieses schönen Landes Raum vereint.
Mag in verschied’nen Klang die Red’ auch schallen,
Der Sinn nur macht den Vaterlandsfreund 38

And in the later Čestmir, in an early indication of resistance to an exclusivist Czech nationalism, the title character is a noble who calls for a sort of nation-state, a single kingdom made up of a single people, while the character Neklan provides a foil, preaching peace and unity between the peoples. 39

But this enthusiastic hermaphroditic pluralism proved to be unable to withstand the pressure of the times. Already in the 1830s, during the furious debates over the Grünberger and Königinhofer manuscripts, fracture lines began to appear within the Czech national movement, driven in part by differences over the extent to which Czech nationalism needed an exclusive pedigree, entirely distinct from German language and culture. 40 But it was above all the upheavals during the revolutionary years of 1848-49, with their soaring hopes and shattering disappointments, which more

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37 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 155 (cf. fn. 6).
39 Ibid. 159.
40 See, for example: Kořálka: František Palacký und die böhmischen Bolzanisten 209 (cf. fn. 29). The Grünberger and Königinhofer manuscripts (in Czech Zelenohorský and Královědovský rukopisy) were documents claimed to be from the 9th and 13th centuries, and thus proof of the early and independent development of a Czech literary tradition. They were early suspected, and eventually proved, to be forgeries. The debate around them tore apart much of the Bohemian intelligentsia until into the 20th century.
than anything else signaled the future trend of nationalism and made the national hermaphroditism of Horn’s generation more and more difficult.

As the crisis began and the democratic enthusiasms in Prague began to percolate the beginning of March, Uffo Horn found himself once again in “Germany,” in Dresden, where he had been staying since 1845, working on the publication of his Gedichte. This was the moment when he wrote,

Wenn meines Volks Trompeten klingen,
Muß ich zurück ins Vaterland!

[...]

Dahin—wo meine Brüder ringen,
Der Leu sich hebt zum Widerstand.  

Horn hurried back to Prague, where he almost immediately established himself as one of the leading figures of the liberal-democratically inclined Prague student movement. His political activity during the first heady months of the revolution is an eloquent demonstration of the “Zwitter” nature, and also the cause of a fair amount of confusion among later historians. While Pfitzner, typically, describes him on the occasion of a speech in Prague at the big meeting on the Sophie-Island on the 28th of March as a “Führer der Tschechen” and dismisses his early activity as being “von slawistischem Geiste durchweht und erhitzt,” the late-20th century Czech historian Arnošt Klíma describes him and Ludvík Ruppert, with whom Horn appeared at the meeting, as “němečtí demokraté,” “German democrats” who had made common cause with the Czech liberals. Klíma’s description echoes that of the Austrian police authorities of the time, who characterized Horn as a member of the German-Democratic party who had tried “seine Prinzipien mit denen der tschechischen Partei zu amalgamieren,” but who then abandoned that effort once he realized that the Czech democrats were “tschechischnational.”

In fact Horn appears to have recognized no such contradiction between German and Czech democracy or nationality. His “hermaphroditic,” dual embrace of German and Czech identities was put on eloquent display shortly after the Sophie-Island meeting, when he was sent as one of a delegation to represent the revolutionary Prague students before the Viennese students. In his maiden speech there, he greeted the assembled in the name of the Prague students.

Wir bringen Euch die Grüße eines Volkes, dessen Schicksale seit jeher mit denen der Deutschen in engem Zusammenhange standen, eines Volkes, das, in seiner Entwicklung seit langer Zeit gehemmt, nun in der milden Sonne der Freiheit neu blühen, wachsen und gedeihen wird. In diesem feierlichen Augenblicke weise ich auch den verläumderischen Vorwurf zurück, als hätte das Slawenthum sich jemals zum Werkzeuge des Despotismus herabwürdigen wollen, als hätten wir je daran gedacht, fremde Nationalitäten zu bedrohen und der Herrschaft der Knute den Weg in die freie, civilisirte Welt zu bahnen. Die Slaven verlangen nichts, als daß

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42 Ibid. 312.
44 Marx: Uffo Daniel Horn 357 (cf. fn. 7).
man sie ungestört sich entwickeln lasse, daß sie die Bildungsresultate der übrigen Völker sich in Ruhe aneignen können, der Slawe ist stolz, aber dankbar, und es genügt ein Blick auf die Geschichte Böhmens und Polens, um darzuthun, daß die Slawen oft genug für die Freiheit Anderer das Schwert zogen, aber nie zu ihrer Unterjochung. 45

Two things stand out about this speech. On the one hand Horn is responding to the then common fear, particularly among Great-German nationalists, of an inherent conflict between freedom-loving German liberalism on the one hand, and a feudal-clerical Slavic reaction on the other. Horn rejects the idea, with a palpable sense of indignation, defending the Czech people, with whom he clearly personally identifies („als hätten wir je daran gedacht […]“), in good romanticist style as a distinct, freedom-loving, yet particularly oppressed people. On the other hand, despite his identification of the Germans as a “fremde Nationalität,” Horn sees the Czechs as a people with a particularly close connection to the Germans, indeed as one apparently deeply indebted to the Germans (“der Slawe ist […] dankbar”), though one to whom the Germans should also be grateful (“daß die Slawen oft genug für die Freiheit Anderer das Schwert zogen […]”), a people at a lower cultural level, who therefore require “die Bildungsresultate der übrigen Völker.”

Although it is clear here that Horn sees himself, at this point at least, as “being” Czech, it is equally clear that this Czechness is in his mind deeply bound up with Germanness. Even more than in his “König Otakar,” Horn exhibits here a belief that the Germans and the Czechs (or more broadly the Slavs) represent two culturally distinct branches of the same historical community of fate. And more than that, his feeling that he “is” a Czech clearly in no way interferes with his use of, and identification with the culture and values of Germandom, as we have already seen in his Vormärz writings. Although Josef Pfitzner would turn the image around (an “actual” German who identifies with Czechs), this is precisely the kind of “hermaphroditism” which causes Pfitzner so much anguish. But in those first intoxicating months of the revolution, Horn’s national ecumenicalism was far from out of the ordinary. Even if there were already in April here and there isolated examples of clashes between more absolutistically minded Czech and German “Ultras,” the great majority of Bohemian democrats at the beginning of the revolution emphasized typically liberal-national goals: the abolition of feudalism; establishment of a liberal-democratic, constitutional state; and, in their minds inseparable from those, national equality and fraternity for all the peoples of the kingdom. An oft-cited public declaration of Bohemian writers from the 21st of March makes clear the connection. The meeting of both Czech- and German-language writers, called by Karl Egon Ebert and František Palacký, and chaired by Pavel Josef Šafařík, adopted a resolution where the assembled declared themselves, gehoben von dem Gefühle der Freiheit und der in der letzten Zeit an den Tag getretenen Eintracht der böhmischen und deutschen Bevölkerung ihres Vaterlandes, […] mit allen Kräften dahin wirken zu wollen, daß dieses glückliche Verhältnis nicht gestört, sondern fest aufrecht

erhalten werde. Es soll auf Grundlage vollständiger Gleichberechtigung beruhen, so daß weder die Böhmen vor den Deutschen, noch die Deutschen vor den Böhmen irgend einen Vorzug genießen sollen.46

According to Palacký, some sixty writers, of both languages, signed the document. Notable, given what lies ahead, is the emphasis on the newly realized “Eintracht” between the nationalities, and at the same time the fear that this could be easily disrupted. Similar sentiments were expressed at the first mass meeting of the radical “Repeal-Club” on the 11th of March in the Wenzelsbad, where the slogan “Čech a Němec jedno tělo!” (“Czech and German one body!”) was enthusiastically adopted.47

By the summer, however, the situation, and the sentiments, were already beginning to change. As seems to happen so often in history after a democratic revolutionary movement achieves its first successes, tensions and splinterings, which had hitherto been unimportant or nonexistent, began to appear and seem to threaten the initial gains: disagreements over tactics and goals between radicals and moderates; collisions between centralistically minded Great-German liberal-nationalists and the calls for Bohemian State’s rights by many Czech nationalists; dark suspicions on the part of the liberals against the supposed Russian, Tsarist overtones of the Pan-Slavics; and above all the wild rumors and street-clashes during the Prague Slavic Congress in June, and the resulting siege, bombardment, and declaration of martial law by imperial troops under Field Marshall Windischgrätz. The fault lines ran along many different lines, primarily political-ideological. But their effect was, above all, to strain the relations, and harden the identities, between Czech-speaking and German-speaking democrats. Intimations of trouble were already apparent at the Wenzelsbad declaration. The meeting had agreed to the drafting of a petition to be sent to the Minister-President of the imperial government in Vienna. During the ensuing discussions over the drafting of the petition, however, deep disagreements erupted between the “Repealists,” led by Karel Havlíček-Borovský, who tended to be more radical-democratic and social-revolutionary, and a group of socially more moderate, but more Czech-nationalistically inclined burghers led by Palacký and František Brauner.48 When a resolution over the disputed language proved to be impossible at the mass-meeting, a committee was designated to work out a compromise. This eventually, after about a week, indeed occurred, but the compromise draft had severely moderated the social demands and hewed much more closely to the Czech-nationalist, state’s rights position of the haut-bourgeois group around Palacký and Brauner. This had the advantage of being able to win the support of


much of the Bohemian aristocracy, but at the cost of the alienation of the most radical and social-democratically inclined.

František Palacký, who later referred to Ebert, while the latter was still living, as “mein ehemaliger Freund,” was one of the first to begin to turn to a more exclusionist, mono-nationalism. The tensions emerging during the 1848 revolutions only caused him to throw himself even more actively into politics, becoming one of the staunchest, albeit socially moderate, Czech nationalists. Despite the fact that until the middle of the century the German language came to him with much more ease than did the Czech, and could be considered the language of his household, Palacký had as early as the 1820s displayed a very self-consciously Czech identity, and one which he posited explicitly against Germanism.

Seit mehr als zwölf hundert Jahren, d.i. seitdem die Čechen sich in Böhmen und Mähren angesiedelt haben, kämpfen sie stets, jedoch nicht mit stetem Glücke, für Erhaltung ihrer Sprache und Nationalität. Vorzüglich Deutsche hatten es zu wiederholten Malen versucht, nicht nur sie zu unterjochen, sondern zu entnationalisiren [...]. Vom IX. Jahrhunderte an bis zu Ende des XI. ist der hierdurch immer neu aufgeregte Nationalhass zwischen Deutschen und Slaven der Schlüssel zur gesammten Geschichte der Böhmen.

This idea was elaborated and sharpened in his celebrated *Geschichte von Böhmen*. But as Jiří Kořalka has argued, this should not be taken (as it was at the time, especially by anxious German-speaking liberals) as evidence of a fierce, German-hating Czech-nationalist radicalism on Palacký’s part. Like Ebert and Horn, Palacký affirmed the pluralistic character of Bohemian society and valued the contributions of the German world to Bohemian culture and science; but in contrast to them, Palacký was more deeply convinced of the essential conflict between Germans and Czechs in Bohemia, and of the idea that the future of Bohemia, even if it still needs the larger Austrian umbrella-state, belongs exclusively to the Czechs. In his famous, and in many circles infamous, public reply of the 11th of April to the Frankfurt “Pre-Parliament’s” invitation to him, Palacký made very clear his conception of Bohemian identity:

Ich bin kein Deutscher, – fühle mich wenigstens nicht als solcher, – [...] Ich bin ein Böhme slawischen Stammes, und habe mit all dem Wenigen, was ich besitze und was ich kann, mich dem Dienste meines Volkes ganz und für immer gewidmet [...]. [Endlich] muss ich meine Ueberzeugung in kurzen Worten dahin aussprechen: dass das Verlangen, Oesterreich (und mit...
ihm auch Böhmen) solle sich volksthümlich an Deutschland anschliessen, d.h. in Deutschland aufgehen, eine Zumuthung des Selbstmords ist [...].

From there Palacký, under the pressure of the growing tensions with the Prague radicals, moved ever more insistently toward an exclusivist Czech nationalism.

The fissures exposed in the aftermath of the Wenzelsbad declaration also severely frightened even more strictly political liberals of the centralizing, Great-German variety, who felt themselves under attack by the supposedly pro-aristocratic and clerical “separatists,” causing many to adopt a more exclusively ethnic German national identity. After the adoption of the compromise draft, most German-identified liberals ceased to have any involvement in the Wenzelsbad group, or, increasingly, with any Czech-identified liberals and democrats. Those who self-consciously embraced the principles of national hermaphroditism found the public space for their views increasingly constrained. Karl Egon Ebert, who had been elected to the Bohemian National Committee, continued for a time to work for moderation and national reconciliation, but he became increasingly disappointed and disgusted by the ever shriller tone of public discourse, and he eventually withdrew from political life and devoted himself exclusively to literature. Even there, his disenchanted and repulsion remained clear to see:

Wär doch solch richtig Maß auch uns gefunden,  
In unsrem fiebrischen Gestaltungsdrang!  
Doch weh! Von jeder Fessel losgebunden  
Rast ein hinwüh’ger Troß; der Überschwang  
Des Freiheitsjubels steckt auch die Gesunden  
Mit seinem Taumel an; bei Sang und Klang  
Verrauscht er sich niegeahnten Wonnen –  
Wer steht da nüchtern noch, wer bleibt besonnen?

Uffo Horn’s evolution was even more startling, and telling. Pfitzner reports that he, too, like Ebert, was throughout the summer becoming ever more alienated from the quarreling in Prague, and in particular from what he perceived as the increasingly anti-German tone of the other radical-democrats, like Karel Havlíček-Borovský, Karel Sabina, and Václav Frič. After his initial appearance as a student leader, Horn retreated from active involvement, until the end of August, when he appears as a representative of his hometown, Trautenau/Trutnov, at a congress of “German-Bohemian” liberals in the northern Bohemian spa-town of Teplitz/Teplice.

The Teplitz congress brought together representatives of “German towns, communities and constitutional societies” at a very anxious juncture for many German-speaking liberals, just a couple months after the ill-fated Prague “uprising” of June and the ensuing military response. Although the tensions that led to those events actually had more to do with a conflict between bourgeois-liberal and proletarian-

55 Ibid. 19-20. See also Kien: Die Konfliktgemeinschaft 77-78 (cf. fn. 27).
56 Cited from Ebert, Karl Egon: Zeitgedichte aus dem Jahre 1848. In: Ebert: Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 5., 272, cited from: Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 294 (cf. fn. 6).
57 Ibid. 314.
radical elements in Prague (as well as with a general popular hatred of Field Marshall Windischgrätz, the imperial commander-in-chief for Bohemia), the general perception outside Prague, and particularly in Vienna and the German-speaking districts of Bohemia, was that the upheaval and violence was connected to the Slavic congress taking place at the same time in Prague, and that it involved "eine große slawische Verschwörung, welche allen Deutschen eine Bartolomäusnacht bereitete," as was reported in a Viennese newspaper. The prevailing tone of fear and defensive nationalism was set at the very beginning of the Teplitz congress by the chairman of the host constitutional association, Dr. Küttenbrugg, who described the general goal of the meeting as, "um hier zu tagen, Euer deutsches Bewusstsein zu kräftigen, um gemeinschaftlich die Schritte zu berathen, die unserer Wohlfahrt als Deutsche Noth thun!" 

Pfitzner triumphantly recounts Horn’s appearance at the congress as the result of a spiritual crisis, a turning point, in which he finally shed his Slavic inclinations and pledged himself to the "inzwischen zur Tat gewordene[m] deutsch[en] Lager." And indeed, the proud, if German-loving Čeche, the one-time leader of the nationally conscious Czech student body, addressed the congress with an unambiguously German greeting, using "we" this time to refer to his allegedly completely, exclusively, and since always German roots: "Es ist eine deutsche Gegend, ein deutsch[es] Gebirge, das mich sendet. Dort ist das deutsche Element unvermischt bis heute geblieben, wir sind nicht erst germanisirt worden, wir sind deutsch zu den Zeiten Otokars, der unsere Städte durch deutsche Einwanderer gründete." 

There can be no doubt but that Horn went through some kind of wrenching intellectual and personal crisis during this time, and that his willingness to participate in Czech-national politics had somehow been shattered. So devoted to the Greater-German cause had he become, that after the dénouement in Austria, Horn went back to Dresden, where he participated in the May Uprising of 1849, and from there to northern Germany, where he served as a volunteer in the war there between the confederated German states and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein until its end in 1851. After that he returned to Trautenau, where he died in 1860, having never again engaged in Bohemian politics.

60 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 314 (cf. fn. 6).
62 Marx: Uffo Daniel Horn 358 (cf. fn. 7).
as both a Czech and a German within the space of just a couple months – is perhaps as much evidence of the multifarious, flexible, “hermaphrodite” nature of his identity, as it is of the simple conversion that Pfitzner would like to see it as.

Although it is clear that Horn’s life as a “national hermaphrodite,” a “Zwitter,” had become difficult and would ultimately become impossible in the prevailing political and social circumstances, and although he had obviously and permanently thrown in his lot with German nationalism over Czech, in fact he strove throughout the congress to keep attention focused on the multiplicity of Bohemian identity, to remain respectful of both its German and Czech identities. His defiant declaration at the congress “daß der Zeitpunkt gekommen ist, wo wir die Scheide wegwerfen müssen,” is potentially misleading. The “feurigen, entschlossenen Gegner,” that he warned of, with their “faulen Unterhandlungen und Friedensbeschlußten, [die] zu nichts geführt [haben], als zu Brüchen und neuen Zwistzen,” are for him the national-radicals, the “Ultras,” whom Horn saw as in league with the counter-revolutionary reaction: “Aristokratie und Bureaucratie, Militär und Krämergeist.” But contrary to the inclinations, apparently, of much of the congress audience (as well as of Pfitzner), Horn made clear elsewhere that under the concept of “Gegner” he did not understand the entire Czech nation: “ihre große Mehrheit ist nicht von einem feindseligen Geiste gegen uns beseelt! – nur eine äußerste Partei, bestehend aus unverbesserlichen Fanatikern, aus herzlosen Egoisten, schürt ihn an.”

Alongside his reference to the Czech nation now as a “they,” rather than a “we,” what is interesting is Horn’s continued insistence that the problem was not a national one, but rather a political one; not a conflict between Czechs and Germans per se, but rather one between radicals in cahoots with reactionaries and “true” democrats. Horn went so far as to suggest that these “enemies” of the liberal-democratic cause were to be found not only amongst Czech radical-nationalists, but also among German nationalists. Indeed, he suggested that the far greater danger lay precisely there, and that the cause had already been lost in Frankfurt:

Ich sehe eine andere Gefahr im Anzuge, die größer ist als die, welche uns von den Czechen, ja von den vereinten slavischen Stämmen drohen kann! Die Partei des Fortschrittes, die aufrichtigen Freunde der Freiheit unterliegen allenthalben, zu Frankfurt, zu Wien, zu Berlin – namentlich aber ist es das Frankfurter Parlament, von dem wir – nichts mehr zu erwarten haben!

This frustrated outburst was met, according to the protocol, by loud objections, to which he responded: “Ja, ich wiederhole es, die Demokratie ist dort in der Minorität, ich glaube nicht, daß wir von dort aus viel mehr zu hoffen haben!” Although his earlier statement about the Czech nation had according to the protocol been received with applause, Horn remained throughout the congress a lonely voice of insistence on the original principles of an ethnically blind, or rather ethnically open – “hermaphrodite” – democratic liberalism. His was a vision that saw the
democratic-liberal dream itself, as well as the kingdom of Bohemia, as being composed of, and enriched by an ethnic-national heterogeneity, which he assumed to be completely natural. In a tone rather reminiscent of his earlier literary endeavors and lifestyle, Horn argued in this same speech energetically for the assembled “German” liberals to learn from the Czechs. And Horn meant this not, as was so often the case with German-nationalist rhetoric, in the sense of learning to become as ruthless and aggressive as they were accused of being, but rather in the honest sense of taking liberal Czech nationalism’s organization and love of freedom as an inspiration and an example to be imitated. He caused more uproar when, with respect to the discussions over the creation of a single, centralized organization, Horn pronounced himself in favor of such a centralization only on the basis of “democracy,” explicitly rejecting the notion of a centralization based solely on German nationality, which he considered simply a cultural issue, and suggesting that democratically inclined Czech nationalist organizations ought to be included.

Auf dem nationalen Gebiet ist Vereinigung unmöglich – sagt, was Ihr wollt, es kommt nicht dazu – nein! nein! es kommt nicht dazu, nur auf dem politischen Kampfplatz können wir neben einander stehen! Die czechischen Demokraten sind tapfere Kampfgenossen, sie werden uns die Macht der Feinde redlich brechen helfen, aber nur unter dem Banner der bedrohten Freiheit! Darum lassen wir das Prinzip der Demokratie nicht aus den Augen, wenn wir die Vereine centralisiren, wir müssen mächtig werden, nicht als Deutsche allein, sondern als freie Männer!

Nothing more of Horn’s proposal was heard during the congress. The tone of the discussions remained stuck in a spiteful, defensive type of mono-ethnic nationalism. Traditional liberal-democratic demands were not entirely ignored, but the greatest concern of the assembled delegates was to defend and preserve “deutsche Einheit.” The main agenda item for the last three days of the congress was the future constitution of Austria and its place in a united Germany. Frictions between industrialist defenders of a laissez-faire economic freedom and the representatives of poorer regions dominated by artisans and small enterprises (the delegates were predominantly lawyers, industrialists, doctors, judges, pharmacists, etc., although there were a few tradesmen and artisans among them) led in the end to parallel demands for the founding of a Greater-Germany and for the preservation of a centralized Austria.

Only their own kingdom of Bohemia seems not to have been able to retain their love and identity. The executive commission submitted a proposal on the 29th of August, in which it was declared, citing a mortal threat to “unsere deutsche Nationalität,” that,

Die deutschredende Bevölkerung in Böhmen lehnt unbedingt jede Verschmelzung mit den Czechen in der Provinzialvertretung und Verwaltung ab […]. Man kann nicht mehr in einen Bestand der Dinge Vertrauen haben, welcher den Czechen so vielfältig Gelegenheit gab, zur Beeinträchtigung, zur Bedrohung der Deutschen. Es ist schmerzlich, dieses aussprechen zu müssen, aber wir müssen uns selbständig stellen und jede Solidarität der Deutschen in der Provinzialvertretung und Verwaltung mit den Czechen auf’s Entschiedenste ablehnen.68

67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. 23.
In the place of the traditional Austrian system of Crownlands, kingdoms and provinces, which were to be completely abolished, the proposal further called for the division of the Austrian state into “Reichskreise” on the basis of the so-called “language border:” “Böhmen würde nach diesem Projekt in 2-3 nördliche deutsche Kreise, in 4-5 innere czechische Kreise einzutheilen sein.”

Vigorous debate followed, primarily over the question of the German-speaking minorities which would be “left behind” in the intended Czech Reichskreise, e.g. in Prague. In the end, the proposal was unanimously approved.

It cannot be known what Horn’s personal reaction to this was; and yet it appears he must have felt constrained to vote for the proposal, although this call for mono-ethnic nationalist solidarity represented the diametric opposite of everything he had professed and pleaded for earlier in his life, and even earlier at that congress. The ultimate frustration of Horn’s hopes for a “nationally hermaphroditic” Bohemia, at least in public political life is, rather pitifully, hinted at in the chorus to a poem – the “Teplitzer Lied” – that Pfitzner says Horn composed for the closing ceremony of the Teplitz congress, and which was submitted as an addendum to the official protocol: “Wir wollen Deutsche sein und bleiben/So heute bis in die Ewigkeit!”

Uffo Horn, the joyful German-writing, Schiller-reading, self-declared Čeche who loved “deutsche Freiheit” had effectively been forced to “choose” and to “become” a German. After the disappointment of the Austrian revolution, as has been noted above, Horn went to northern Germany, to fight in the Schleswig campaign for the Greater-German cause, and then withdrew to his home in Trautenau, where he died 9 years later.

The case of Uffo Horn, and of Karl Egon Ebert and so many of the rest of that generation of Bohemian intellectuals, including even the prototypical Czech nationalist František Palacký, suggests very strongly that pre-nationalist society in Austria was perhaps not so much “nonational” or “anational,” as it was multiply national. Rather than arising at once, ex nihilo, in their fully monopolized, hegemonic, monolithic-nationalist form, it would appear that, for much of Bohemian society, firm nationalist identities instead evolved more gradually out of an identity constellation which, far from being empty of ethnic-national content, was actually marked by an ability to float freely between and among multiple ethnic-national identities which were not only acknowledged but enthusiastically embraced, and even by the ability to “hermaphroditically” express multiple such identities simultaneously.

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69 Ibid. 24.

70 Only one original copy of the Stenographischer Bericht of the Teplitz congress appears any longer to exist, in the library of the ANM Praha. This copy, however, is missing several pages, including the one with the results of the vote on this proposal. The vote result is reported in Polišenský, Josef: Aristocrats and the Crowd in the Revolutionary Year 1848. A Contribution to the History of Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Austria. Albany 1980, 180. I am most grateful to Dr. Edvárd Mikušek, lately of the Státní oblastní archiv v Litoměřicích (Regional State Archive in Litoměřice) for his assistance in locating the surviving copy of the Teplitz protocol.

71 Pfitzner: Das Erwachen der Sudetendeutschen 316 (cf. fn. 6).
The fact of the gradual erosion of opportunities for the playful “hermaphroditic” embrace of multiple ethnic-national identities, the growing polarization of Austrian society between rigidly defined and exclusivist mono-national identities over the course of the second half of the 19th century is almost invariably seen as having been pernicious to the development of a democratic polity and the idea of liberal-democratic citizenship and civil society. Nationalism itself is generally viewed, as it was by many viewers at the time, as the antithesis of liberal principles and practices, a betrayal of liberalism’s universalist, egalitarian, and rationalist core values in favor of an irrational politics of “Blut und Boden,” a turn towards the “dark gods” of a particularist, tribalist past against the rational universalism and egalitarianism of the Enlightenment.\(^{72}\) In such a view, the putative failure of a liberal politics in the second half of the 19th century is laid at the feet of the rise of popular nationalist forces.\(^{73}\)

Such a view, however, while superficially understandable for its ability to avoid liberal blame for the nationalist disasters to come, fails to hold up when confronted with the historical record and the ways in which liberalism was in fact understood by those who preached it at the time. Pieter Judson, for example, has shown convincingly how the turn towards a populist, radical nationalist, and eventually racist politics was not so much a betrayal of liberal principles and practices, as it was in fact conditioned fundamentally by those very principles and practices, and, ultimately, represented the shape of their ultimate fulfillment in the conditions of the turn-of-the-century.

The liberals themselves created a powerful new politics organized around nationalist identity in order to repulse the growing threats to their local hegemony. […] Liberal rhetoric about society provided a crucial ideological foundation for the later explosion of German nationalist politics at the end of the nineteenth century, as activists transformed their ideas about the social differences that separated the spheres of active and passive citizenship into beliefs about national differences. […] Even the German radical and anti-Semitic groups that challenged liberal hegemony in the 1880s and 1890s simply promised to carry out liberal nationalist commitments more effectively.\(^{74}\)

Indeed, I would argue that the turn to a nationally exclusivist rhetoric after the 1880s from the universalistic rhetoric before 1848, is not only comprehensible as a necessary reaction to a changed political constellation, but that in fact the exclusivist

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\(^{72}\) Although he does not subscribe to the “dark gods” view, Ernest Gellner describes it in Gellner, Ernest: Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca/NY 1983, 130. – Elie Kedourie also discusses the importance of “the dark gods and their rites” in the postcolonial nationalisms of Asia and Africa, in the introduction to Kedourie, Elie (ed.): Nationalism in Asia and Africa. London 1971, 106.

\(^{73}\) This kind of interpretation is most often explicitly made for the history of the rise of German nationalism, though it has also, if more subtly and implicitly, been made for the supposedly more liberal “minority” nationalisms within the Austrian monarchy like the Czech. See for example Macura, Vladimír: Znamení zrodu: České národní obrození jako kulturní typ [Birth Signs: The Czech National Renaissance as a Cultural Type], 2nd ext. ed Jinočany 1995.

particularism which is so prevalent after the turn of the century is rhetorically present with all its future implications already in that earlier, “purer” form of liberalism. At the very core of the idea of a democratic civil society based on equal citizenship is in fact an understanding of society that is fundamentally hierarchical and exclusionary.

In her thoroughly stimulating and provocative study of the ways in which power was envisioned and restricted across the gender-frontier in early America, Mary Beth Norton distinguishes between the pre-Enlightenment, “Filmerian” worldview (named for the English political theorist Sir Robert Filmer), and the Enlightenment view of state and society propagated by John Locke.75 The former, the “Filmerian,” outlook “saw family and state as analogous institutions, linked symbiotically through their similar historical origins, aims, and functions” and “assumed the necessity of hierarchy in family, polity, and society at large.” Thus, “[a]uthority in all aspects of life theoretically emanated from the top, not the bottom, of those essential hierarchical structures.”76 The new “Lockean” philosophy, on the other hand, “severed the connection between family and state; he in particular contended forcefully that the state originated not in the family but in a contractual agreement among men, and that the aims and functions of the resulting polity were very different from those of the family.”77 This was a view of society, that while in many ways radically new, actually reached back to an idealized version of the ancient Athenian city-state, wherein “the polis, composed only of men, was based on equality, while the family, composed of men and women, incorporated hierarchies of age, wealth, and gender.”78

The implications of this distinction for my purposes here are straightforward, though sobering. Liberal democratic civil society is conceived of as a “social contract,” a compact consciously and voluntarily entered into by independent and sovereign actors for their own individual, and by implication their mutual, benefit. For such a compact to function, it is imperative, from a theoretical perspective, that the participants be absolutely equal to each other, capable of rational self-reflection, and free from any kind of dependence which might limit their ability to act in a strictly rational, calculable manner. This would, of course, from the perspective of the day, necessarily exclude the participation of children, women, and men who did not own property and were hence dependent on others for their livelihood and security. “Filmerian” society, recognizing no radical separation between “public” and “private” spheres, acknowledged a place, subordinate as it may have been, for these dependent classes within the much larger hierarchy of social position – a hierarchy in which virtually all groups below that of the “sovereign” monarch, were in one way or another subordinated and dependent. The “Lockean” system, by contrast, envisioned a radical separation between the hierarchically organized “private”

76 Ibid. 4.
77 Ibid. 5.
78 Ibid. 10.
sphere (based and modeled on the family) and the “public” sphere of a contractual, egalitarian “civil society,” in which those unable, or not permitted to participate as complete equals were entirely excluded. What I think is most interesting about this is the extent to which what is involved here with the creation of what will come to be called “civil society” is, contrary to the ways in which we usually think of it, a radical limitation, or restriction of the scope of “publicness” itself, attended by a drastic increase in its claims to political significance. This understanding closely parallels, or intersects with Jürgen Habermas’s now classic argument that, “[t]he shift in function of the principle of publicity is based on a shift in function of the public sphere as a special realm,” a realm conceived as being in opposition to the “public” authority of the state, where private individuals come together to form a “public” to pass critical judgment on the state and so protect their private interests.79

This inherent exclusivity at the heart of the liberal-universalist principle of civil society and a democratic public sphere was to have, I am arguing, fatal consequences for the evolution of the “national” idea and the future of multi-ethnic, multi-linguistic states like Bohemia and the Austrian monarchy. With the development of a liberal politics based on popular sovereignty and an internally egalitarian, critically engaged “public,” the previously irrelevant ethnic-linguistic intermixing, the multiplicity of ethnic identities and indeed the ability of single individuals to “float” between ethnic-linguistic identities as the social situation requires, became unacceptable. Just as the demands of citizenship required that women as well as propertyless and uneducated men be excluded from the newly engaged public sphere, so too the demands of an informed and critically engaged public which could be counted on to understand each other’s interests and act in a “reasonable” and calculable manner were perceived to require an ethnic narrowing of citizenship, a restriction of the public sphere to those of the same language, world-view, and culture; those who professed the same “identity,” and who could be counted on to remain in that identity.

Note that what is being suggested here is not, as has been so often suggested about places like the Habsburg monarchy and the Balkans, that what we are dealing with is some kind of fundamental or essential incompatibility between ethnic groups, but rather a perception, a construction of “unassimilability.” In a pre-liberal, pre-nationalist – “Filmerian” – society, the co-existence of a variety of languages and ethnic cultures and identities was in no sense perceived as a problem. In a strictly hierarchically structured society, where power is located in a distant “sovereign,” different sub-groups with different cultures need not assimilate to each other, need not become entirely the same in order to comprehend each other and coexist peacefully – each has its place. Similarity, equivalency, and total transparency are of no particular value in such a society. But it is precisely such total transparency and assimilation which the “Lockean” civil society requires. Certainly there is no inherent requirement that the basis of that presumption of assimilability be rooted in ethnic or linguistic identities; there are enough examples of successful civic identities constructed

on something other than language or ethnic identity. But in a society in which the basis for the mobilization of a public civic identity is already, for whatever historical-ideological reasons, that of ethnically and linguistically constructed “nations” – which has been the dominant model in Europe’s modern age – the tolerance for multi-lingual, multi-ethnic “national hermaphrodites,” which had been, I argue, a dominant reality during the intellectual excitement of the early “discovery” of nationality and nationalism, was bound to disappear. The polarization of society around hegemonic and exclusivistic mono-national identities, far from representing a failure of, or departure from a liberal politics of civil society, might perhaps be seen rather as an almost unavoidable precondition of that civil society.

Democratic civil society and exclusionary ideologies – in 19th-century Europe particularly ethnic-national exclusivity – are very possibly much more integrally linked than we have so far been willing to recognize. The burgeoning literature on the 19th- and 20th-century problems of genocide and ethnic cleansing are in fact beginning to come to just such conclusions. What a hierarchically structured, “Filmerian” society had been able to tolerate, even embrace – whether biological hermaphrodites or “nationale Zwitter” – became intolerable and threatening in the egalitarian “Lockean” civil society of liberalism. The price of citizenship turns out, perhaps, to have been precisely the loss of diversity.

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80 Again, see for example: Mann: The Dark Side of Democracy (cf. fn. 5); Nodia: Nationalism and Democracy (cf. fn. 5); Levene: The Rise of the West and the Coming of Genocide (cf. fn. 5).